Josep Borrell
Terrorist attacks are on the increase in the Sahel, particularly in Mali. While the international community undoubtedly has lessons to learn from its action in the region over the past ten years, the refusal of any international coordination and the choice of a purely security response based on private mercenaries have only aggravated the situation. As the threat spreads, the Sahel urgently needs a collective leap forward.
For a decade now, the European Union has been engaged in the Sahel alongside its African and international partners in the fight against terrorism. This fight is of course first and foremost an African affair, but it also concerns Europe and the world. Indeed, the destabilization of the Sahel by terrorists constitutes a direct threat for the Union not only in terms of security and terrorism but also in many other areas such as trafficking of all kinds. This is why, since the beginning of my mandate, I have been personally involved in this file, in particular by visiting the region in April 2021 .
As the last soldiers of the Barkhane force, deployed by France, leave Mali, the situation has deteriorated sharply on the ground in recent weeks, with the multiplication of terrorist attacks affecting both soldiers and civilians. Beyond their particularly heavy human toll, especially recently for the Malian army, it is both the growing geographical spread of these attacks and the increasingly sophisticated operating methods used by terrorists that should alarm us.
“Beyond their particularly heavy human toll, it is both the growing geographic spread of terrorist attacks and their increasingly sophisticated methods of operation that should alarm us. »
Indeed, in the Sahel but now also in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, terrorists are increasingly aiming to isolate the populations of the capitals of the countries of the region, as shown by the explosion of the bridges of Woussé and Naré in Burkina Faso last July. The roads connecting Niamey, capital of Niger, and Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso are no longer secure, yet they are the ones that provide the main connections to and from the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The symbolic, political and material isolation of populations is reinforced and they therefore become an easier breeding ground for their recruitment by terrorist movements.
This degradation is first of all rooted in the gradual sidelining of African and international actors whose mandate is precisely to help restore peace and security in the region. It then confirms the failure of a purely security strategy: the fight against terrorism cannot be won solely on the military ground. As I have said many times, to win this war you must also win the peace.
A continued weakening of regional and international coordination
The deterioration of the security situation results in particular from the failure of the policy pursued by the Malian authorities following the coups of 2020 and 2021: fragile states are never strengthened by long transitions. The G5 Sahel,created in 2014 to coordinate the action of the authorities of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, has continued to be weakened in recent months. Mali’s withdrawal, announced last May, dealt this organization an almost fatal blow, even though regional coordination remains the essential foundation for an effective fight against terrorism and for the development of the Sahel.
The United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), set up by the Security Council in 2013, has also continued to be weakened. Because of the attitude of the Malian transitional authorities, it cannot implement the new mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council last June: these authorities have in fact prohibited Blue Helmets from entering certain parts of the territory – especially those where abuses were committed by the Malian Armed Forces and Wagner’s Russian mercenaries.
They also proceeded last July to the arrest of 49 Ivorian soldiers still detained for obscure reasons. Despite attempts at mediation by the United Nations or the Presidency of the African Union, the Malian authorities have just charged them with “attempting to undermine state security”. During the first days of August, these transitional authorities had also requested the withdrawal of Spanish and German helicopters used by MINUSMA and the EU training mission. As a result, Germany had to temporarily suspend its participation in MINUSMA.
“The effectiveness of the anti-terrorist system is undermined by the action of foreign private mercenaries who stand out more for their abuses against civilian populations than for their ability to fight effectively against jihadists.
Our European missions EUTM Maliand EUCAP Sahel Mali , which have trained approximately 18,000 Malian soldiers since 2013 (half of the country’s military personnel), are also increasingly being sidelined by the transitional authorities. Finally, the withdrawal of the Barkhane force, deployed by France, and of the Takuba force, associating special forces soldiers from 9 European countries, completes the picture of a very weakened counter-terrorism system. The effectiveness of this system is further undermined by the action of private foreign mercenaries who are more famous for their abuses against civilian populations than for their willingness and ability to fight effectively against jihadists.
The limits of “all military”
The multiplication of terrorist attacks in the Sahel in recent months also reminds us of the failure of a strategy to fight terrorism, based on a mainly military response. For our part, we had already recorded such a failure: to be sustainable, any military gain must imperatively be consolidated by actions benefiting the most vulnerable populations. This is valid in the Sahel, but also elsewhere in the world. This was the meaning of the “civil and political surge” that we had decided on with our Sahelian partners before the coups d’etat jeopardized this strategic turning point.
“In the Sahel, we must tackle terrorism as well as its root causes, namely the weakness of the rule of law and the absence of basic services for all, throughout the territory. »
The fight against terrorism as the EU understands it and supports it in the Sahelmust indeed tackle terrorism as much as its root causes, namely the weakness of the rule of law and the absence of basic services for all, throughout the territory. This is undoubtedly a long-term task. Strengthen our support for programs focused on access to basic services and put this civil and political upsurge back at the heart of the fight against terrorism by supporting credible political transitions and democratically legitimized authorities, this is the priority of the action European in the region.
This approach is certainly not that of Wagner’s private mercenaries. The “punch” actions carried out by the Malian armed forces and the Russian mercenaries of Wagner who assist them seem to be thought of and executed as punitive expeditions against certain populations. This can only fuel, in the Sahel as elsewhere, a cycle of violence and endless reprisals.
The fight against terrorism cannot be improvised, nor can it be delegated to mercenaries with obscure motivations. The events of the last few weeks have reminded us of this with acuity.
