Fruits of cleansing

Andrey Arkhangelsk

The American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in its analytical report published on October 3, concludes that open criticism of its own generals has appeared in the public space in Russia. They are criticized both on TV and in the blogosphere loyal to the authorities, which was previously unimaginable. ISW explains that the defeat of the Russian army in Liman threw the propaganda into even more confusion than the retreat in the Kharkiv region.
The rhetoric is changing even among the propagandists of the first row, like S-olovyov, Simonyan, Skab-eeva. For example, Yevgen-y Popov, TV presenter, de-puty and husband of Ska-beeva, published a post w-here he demanded “true de-mocracy” and “reform of t-he judiciary.” Margarita Si-monyan criticizes the generals, whose decisions “co-uld harm the country and the people.” Vladimir Solo-vyov scolds the former window dressing – “parades”, behind the facade of which significant shortcomings were hidden.
The wave of criticism and self-criticism among propagandists is not the first time. The leaders of the Russian opposition , as well as ordinary Russians who o-ppose the war, in such cases write in the comments “lo-ok, they change their shoes on the go”, “look, they do-n’t want to go to The Ha-gue” (meaning the Hague Tribunal). The Ukrainian media, commenting on the situation, generally come to the conclusion that “beca-use of the defeats at the fr-ont, propagandists are turning away from the Kremlin” (such a headline, for example, was given by Ukrayi-nska Pravda). However, such statements are too idealistic. Propaganda engages in self-criticism not at all out of fear – for now, anyway.
Fruits of cleansing
Those who have left Russia for political reasons view the current situation through the lens of an impending collapse of the system. But in the “Russia of the present” the dream of a certain number of people (they are usually called patriots) has already come true. And they already live in “ideal”, from their point of view, Russia, which is at war with NATO. The fundamental patriotic idea that preceded the catastrophe—the war Putin unleashed against Ukraine—was for a grand “purge,” or, to be more precise, a cleansing of Russian society.
The concept in brief is as follows (for example, it was outlined at a meeting of the “Prilepin group” about “tra-itors” among the creative elite). During the years of “so-called democracy” (hereinafter the author follows the original language), a large number of traitors have accumulated in Russia – those who do not love their homeland. Therefore, all spheres of society need to be cleansed (self-cleansing) from the superfluous – from those who openly defected to the side of the West, secretly crap or simply remain silent.
As soon as Russia manages to be cleansed of internal enemies, everything will go smoothly. Because – and this is the fundamental idea underlying this ultra-patriotic ideology – the overwhelming majority of Russian society is homogeneous, thinks and feels the same, and has a similar worldview. And as soon as the authorities deal with a “pure” society, victory over the West is not far off.
Cleaning happened by itself. Hundreds of thousands of active opponents of the Putin regime left immediately after the start of the war. Another wave of forced immigrants, also numbering in the hundreds of thousands, left Russia after the announcement of mobilization. It can be said that the dream of the patriots has come true: only “their own” remain in Rus-sia. It is this situation that dictates a change in propagandist rhetoric. There are no traitors, some renegades have quieted down, and failures, including military ones, still continue. Their r-easons need to be explained somehow – but now not to strangers, but exclusively to their own. This fundamentally changes the approach.
Returning to the idea of propaganda for the hundredth time, it must be clarified that its stupid uniformity irritated not only “internal enemies”, but also “our own” – loyalists and patriots. However, it had to be endured, and it was a kind of unspoken agreement, a broad internal consensus in the loyalist environment: we ourselves do not believe in propaganda, but we need it to defeat internal enemies. Propaganda is such an Archimedean fulcrum that will cleanse Russia of harmful, alien Western influence. And then, of course, no propaganda will be needed, because only “their own” will remain, who will be able to speak honestly. What’s the point of lying to your own?
There will even be pluralism in the media, based, of course, on love for the motherland. But different opinions, including criticism of the authorities, are acceptable. Even Putin himself has repeatedly said that patriotism (love for the motherland) is the basis of everything; and on this basis, it is already possible to create, among other things, a unique, special Russian democracy.
And here is done. The deed is done, the society is cleansed. Maybe propaganda is no longer needed? And propagandists can become ordinary (no matter how crazy it sounds) journalists? And behave like in a normal society? Strictly based, of course, on love for the motherland, but still pluralistic? Here is a new psychological and emotional situation in which Russian propagandists find themselves. At a historical moment, when, in their opinion, the fate of Russia and the world is being decided, and when “everyone is their own,” Solovyov or Simonyan do not at all want to be completely idols. In addition, now they are forced to reckon with the increased dem-ands of their audience (na-mely, exclusively “theirs”), which, after a grand cleansing of enemies, now demands, oddly enough, not only victorious reports, but also the truth, even bitter.
The feelings of society in moments of military failures are especially aggravated; it is impossible to hide such catastrophes (after all, the information age is in the yard). And now the terrible word “corruption” is already heard from the lips of “their own”. The Kremlin struggled with this word for so long, so carefully banished it. So much effort has gone into discrediting it and delegating it (foreign agent laws were devised primarily to deal with Russian investigative journalists who reported on the extent of corruption in the highest echelons of power), all to no avail.
Now this word is “corruption in the army!” say entirely loyal citizens. And this accusation is no longer so easy to get rid of – precisely because it is uttered by those whose sons or husbands are sent to fight against Ukraine. Or those who try to speak to the state on their behalf. This new situation – when feelings are exposed and when there are friends around – forces propagandists to write critical comments on social networks from time to time. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, you must still restrain yourself: you cannot tell the whole truth if it is contrary to the interests of the state. That is, the Kremlin. That is Putin.
Spontaneous democracy
All this tells us, first of all, about the peculiarities of Russian society. It is neither liberal nor democratic, but, shall we say, democratized. Whatever they say, the experience of the 1990s was not in vain. Some rudimentary notions of democracy have taken root even among conservative audiences. We can put forward the assumption that the laws of democracy are self-rep-roducing even in a sealed homogenized Russian society, cleansed of “traitors and enemies.” And no matter how homogeneous the society that remains in Russia is, it is still not completely homogeneous. It is difficult to create an absolutely homogeneous society that will lie to itself. As a result, the Kremlin once again faces the eternal dilemma: tell your people the truth or hide it? It is no longer possible to literally repeat the situation of the late USSR (when there was no access to hostile information or it was difficult to access) in the era of YouTube and telegram c-hannels.
However, it is impossible to allow complete freedom of opinion even among one’s own. This is impossible because it contradicts, first of all, the worldview of Putin himself. In his view, there can be no “friends” in principle – since in reality he does not trust anyone (perhaps a very small circle of close associates). This means that those who today demand the truth or criticize the authorities will be pulled back (as has happened more than once), corrected or, in the future, excommunicated from the air. The Kremlin cannot allow pluralism even among its own people. For him, freedom of opinion is tantamount to chaos and leads to the collapse of the state – such is the traumatic experience of Gorbachev’s perestroika for the Chekists. Therefore, everyone should play the game started by the Kremlin, according to its rules. That is, to say not what is, but what is needed. Kremlin.
And those who do not want to play by the rules, one way or another, will be shifted – through the position of unreliable, unpredictable, too voluntary, that is, willful allies – into the category of hidden enemies. And since there are hidden enemies, society has not yet been completely cleansed. And that means new purges ahead. And so in a circle.
This is, in its own way, an answer to the riddle of Soviet history – why do repressions appear here as if from scratch? And already against the loyal, against the “reinforced concrete”? At times when the state is already having a hard time? Why does the state choose to shoot itself in the foot? Between the bitter truth and repression, the Russian regime—following the Soviet one—will almost certainly choose repression.
Putin and the Kremlin cannot imagine that the demand for truth is, in its own way, a natural thing for society, as well as for every person. And therefore, new purges (another wave of cleansing from traitors) are inevitable if criticism from below begins to intensify.
Russia’s population is still huge—losing another half-million disaffected to the Kremlin doesn’t seem terrifying compared to the risk that the remaining tens of millions will find out the truth or just think they’re allowed to have an opinion.
The previous cleansing of society from traitors, according to the ideologues, should have led to an unprecedented unity of the nation around the state and around the flag. This, however, does not happen. On the contrary, if there are questions to the state, this means that the society is rather frustrated than united. This situation contradicts, first of all, the picture of the world of Vladimir Putin himself, who has repeatedly proved that he is ready for the most insane adventures (up to nuclear blackmail), just not to give up his own picture of the world. Therefore, he will continue to build an “ideal society” in Russia, intensifying repression – now against “his own”.
The only problem is that such an ideal (in the view of Putin and the Kremlin ideologists) society is possible only if it consists of one person – the leader himself. Otherwise, the state will inevitably have to deal with different opinions, including criticism, which now, to the surprise of many, but in fact quite naturally, comes from the mouths of speakers loyal to the Kremlin.