Japan’s G7 agenda emerges in face of geopolitical gale

Andrew Hammond

Japan’s G7 in 2023 has been dominated by the geopolitical gale that continues to blow from Ukraine. Yet the outlines of the economic agenda have become much clearer in April.
One of the defining priorities of Japan’s chairing of the event will be promoting — ahead of COP28 in Dubai this November — the energy transition. And this will be a key feature of an April 15-16 ministerial meeting of the Western club. Tokyo has long been a leader on this important agenda and has developed numerous green alliances with powers across the world, including the EU, to try to deliver on decarbonization while securing a stable energy supply, and promoting economic growth.
Economic security, including export controls, is another key G7 economic platform this year for Japan. These issues were prominent in last Tuesday’s first meeting of G7 trade ministers in 2023 with the nations committing to enhance their outreach to international partners, including the Global South, in order to boost supply chain resiliency.
The move comes soon after Tokyo announced that it will curtail exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment. This echoes US moves in this area designed to impede Beijing’s defense and wider technological momentum that the G7 ministers said on Tuesday threaten “global, regional, and national security.”
A broader issue that appears central to Japan’s G7 presidency, at the prompting of the US, is economic security, particularly in a context of challenging coercion from authoritarian powers. An example sometimes cited here is China’s increasing tariffs on key Australian imports after the latter’s government pushed for an international inquiry into the origins of the pandemic.
However, the issue has also come onto the radar screen since the Ukraine war began with the G7 condemning Moscow’s intent to use Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas as a weapon. For instance, state-owned Gazprom cut gas deliveries last year to numerous nations, including France and Italy, just days after their leaders were in Kyiv to formally back Ukraine’s bid to join the EU.
The US is already moving forward unilaterally on this agenda with a bill being considered in Congress that would grant the nation’s president stronger powers to counter Chinese economic coercion. However, the Biden team wants to explore joint G7 and wider economic action.
This G7 emphasis on economic security shows how, even though the body is most associated with financial affairs, its role as a geopolitical lynchpin has long been key too. And this is assuming paramount importance some 14 months into the Ukraine war.
The Western club is spearheading the massive international package of sanctions against Moscow; has pledged never to recognize any redrawn boundaries for Ukraine; provided tens of billions in military and humanitarian assistance; and is currently looking at plans to rebuild Ukraine in what would be a mini-version of the postwar Marshall Plan that saw the US-backed rebuilding of postwar Europe.
As well as this year’s G7 super priority of Ukraine, a second key focus for Japan in 2023 is what Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has called the “absolutely unacceptable” threat of nuclear proliferation, and it is therefore no coincidence that the leadership summit is being held in Hiroshima where the US detonated a nuclear bomb in 1945. These proliferation concerns have been raised recently in Europe with Russia threatening to potentially move atomic weaponry to Belarus.
However, the challenge of proliferation in Japan’s eyes is much broader, including in Asia. For instance, recent North Korean ballistic missile tests have raised concerns of a breakdown in security in the region.
These twin focal points of Japan’s G7 year are only the latest examples of the prominence of geopolitical and security issues in the Western club’s meetings. In recent years, the body has played a significant orchestration role in the West’s policies.
When Japan last held the G7 chair in 2016, for instance, there was a significant discussion of the geopolitics of the South China Sea. This prompted strong objections from Beijing, which claims much of the South China Sea, and which asserted that the G7 should focus its time on its founding mandate of global economic cooperation.
As this reaction indicates, the G7’s involvement in its geopolitical dialogues has met with significant international criticism from time to time. In this context, it is sometimes asserted, especially by developing countries, that the G7 lacks the legitimacy of the UN to engage in these geopolitical and security issues, and/or is a historical artefact given the rise of powers such as BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
However, it is not the case that the international security role of the G7 is new. The body helped coordinate Western strategy toward the then-Soviet Union. Its capacity for action was shown when it played an important role in convincing Moscow to pull out the remnants of the Red Army from the Baltic States.
Taken together, this is why the Japan-hosted G7 will be dominated by geopolitics. Moreover, continuing uncertainty over the Ukraine conflict means this security role is not only likely to continue, but could even grow.