Dmitry Trenin
Only a year has passed since long-term Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resigned, and the head of government is already changing in the country. Yoshihide Sugi was succeeded by Fumio Kishida, who served as foreign minister in Abe’s cabinet for almost five years, from 2012 to 2017.
In foreign policy, the main challenge for Japan’s new government will be the growing confrontation between its most important neighbor, China, and its main ally, the United States. The Biden administration has already taken a number of steps to re-energize Quad’s quadripartite security dialogue, in which Australia and India are also participating in addition to the States and Japan. Washington recently agreed with Canberra and London to supply Australia with nuclear submarines – in the future, they will be able to patrol the western Pacific Ocean off the coast of China. The geopolitical confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region is rapidly acquiring a military component.
Is it possible in such conditions to preserve at least something of Abe’s foreign policy heritage in the Russian direction? Indeed, over the long eight years of his premiership, he put so much effort to improve relations with Russia through economic cooperation.
At first glance, there are few reasons for optimism. Cooperation between Russia and China, which worries Japan, will continue to deepen, including in the military sphere. Amendments to the Russian Constitution adopted last year prohibit the transfer of territories to other countries. Russian officials and state media began regularly recalling Japan’s actions during World War II, although this was rarely discussed before. As for the South Kuriles, Moscow has invited Tokyo to participate in economic projects on the islands, but on its own terms and without granting an exclusive status.
Thus, the above question could have been answered in the negative, but such an answer cannot be called particularly constructive. To use popular (albeit often incorrect) comparisons with the Cold War, the current confrontation between the United States and China has created two poles in international relations, but not two blocs – at least not yet. And again, despite the widespread and incorrect opinion, Moscow did not become a vassal of Beijing. In general, Russia is very attentive to the issues of its own state sovereignty, and therefore strives for balance – which does not mean equidistance – between its main partner (China) and its main adversary (the United States). Tokyo should take this circumstance into account when building relations with Moscow.
The territorial dispute with Russia is considered very important for Japanese society, but this issue is much more symbolic than practical. And the main practical achievement of Abe’s course of rapprochement with Russia was that the countries agreed on a bilateral format of consultations at the highest level on security and foreign policy issues.
At a time when security concerns are coming to the fore in the Indo-Pacific region, it is very important to maintain a channel for direct personal contact with a neighboring power. The “2 + 2” format, which provides for Russian-Japanese consultations at the level of foreign and defense ministers, provides such an opportunity. This format became a visiting card of Abe’s foreign policy, who never questioned Japan’s alliance with the United States, but at the same time was ready to actively defend Japanese interests, and not just passively hope that other powers would take them into account.
The new prime minister, Kishida, has considerable foreign policy experience and will undoubtedly try to bring something of his own into Japanese foreign policy. But he should hardly neglect the achievements of his predecessor, one of which is the unique mechanism of consultations with Russia. And it can be used to discuss a wide variety of geopolitical and security issues throughout the Indo-Pacific region, from North Korea to Afghanistan.
Moreover, even under Abe, Japan’s economic ties with Russia were not charity at all. Moscow’s initiatives to develop Eastern Siberia open up new opportunities for Japanese companies. The same can be said for Russia’s first energy transition plans to combat climate change and projects already underway in the Arctic. At the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok in September, Japan was not represented at the highest level, even in a virtual format – an annoying circumstance that does not benefit anyone.
For the foreseeable future, Japan will remain a staunch ally of the United States. It is also safe to say that, at least in the medium – and possibly long – term – the partnership between Russia and China will deepen. However, this does not mean that Moscow and Tokyo must inevitably view each other as adversaries.
Moreover, if it comes to a large-scale armed conflict between the United States and China, it is likely to develop into a nuclear war and lead to a global catastrophe. Therefore, other major powers, including Russia and Japan, are vitally interested in preventing such a clash.
Moscow and Tokyo need to strengthen the still very shaky foundations of mutual trust and discuss emerging problems and claims before they lead to conflict. Also, the two countries will only benefit if they avoid incidents and develop mutually beneficial economic cooperation.
The fact that, 75 years after the end of World War II, Russia and Japan never signed a peace treaty is completely abnormal. However, the very incompleteness of the peace process should serve as a stimulus for the development of relations. You can, of course, give up everything, but this is clearly not the best option.
The article was published in Japanese on the Kyodo website.
Courtesy: (Carnegie.ru)
