Putin and Xi listen to each other

Written by The Frontier Post

Petr Akopov

The telephone conversation between Putin and Xi Jinping took place on the birthday of the Chinese leader, who turned 69, just like our president. But it was not about that at all. In addition, in China, as in Russia, the birthday of the head of state is not celebrated: the legacy of the cult of personality affected, although during the life of Mao in the Celestial Empire they did not celebrate the day of his birth. Now both countries are acting as active reformers of the world order, facing increasing pressure from the West in response, and coordination between them requires more and more effort and attention, primarily from their leaders.
Therefore, it is no coincidence that Putin and Xi noted that relations between the two countries are constantly improving, and agreed to expand cooperation in energy, financial, industrial, transport and other areas “taking into account the situation in the global economy that has become more complicated due to the illegitimate Western sanctions policy.” This is not only about bilateral cooperation, but also about “building a truly multipolar and fair system of international relations.” That is, both states are constantly reminding that they really have global goals, and it cannot be otherwise, given the scale and significance of our countries.
The BRICS summit will take place in a week, and although it will be held online due to covid restrictions, its significance will be great.
After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the Atlanticists made a lot of efforts in an attempt to influence the position of India, persuading her to distance herself from Russia. But everything turned out exactly the opposite – and not only in Russian-Indian relations, but also in the Russia-India-China triangle, which is of fundamental importance, and in Indian-Chinese relations. Although Delhi does not refuse to participate in the openly anti-Chinese QUAD (which, however, is not of a military nature), they are not going to allow the West to play the card of contradictions between these two countries.
And even trying to play on Russian-Chinese differences is completely ridiculous, but the West still believes that it potentially has such opportunities. It is very difficult to come to terms with the idea that time has been lost for a very long time and all attempts to play on “Russia’s fear of China” or ” China ‘s costs of supporting Russia” now look simply frivolous. This does not mean that the sanctions war against Russia does not affect our trade and economic ties with China, it will take a lot of time and effort to get around the numerous problems created by the West, but the principled attitude of Moscow and Beijingto “relationships without limits” cannot be undone. And the point here is not the fundamentally changed international situation after February 24: Putin and Xi are united by both common strategic goals and an understanding of the national goals of their partner, and they have been on the path to achieving these goals together for ten years now.
Therefore, it is surprising that such an experienced strategist as Henry Kissinger continues to make his forecasts based on non-working, non-existent categories, in particular, from the premise of the instability of the Russian-Chinese alliance and the possibility of the West to influence relations between Moscow and Beijing.
The other day, in an interview published by The Sunday Times, the former secretary of state said that “the question now is how to end this war. became China’s outpost in Europe.
That is, the main interest of the West in Russia is to prevent it from becoming an instrument for China’s influence on Europe ? It is clear that Kissinger deliberately simplifies, deliberately plays on the fears of Beijing that are fanned (without his participation) in the West, but it still sounds very strange.
Because Russia cannot become its outpost in Europe: this does not meet not only Russian, but also Chinese interests (Beijing needs a strong ally, not a weak dependent puppet).
In the same way, by the way, like China in the 50s, it was not an outpost of “Red Russia” in Asia. This was a conscious or voluntary delusion of the United States (not to mention the propaganda use of the “Soviet threat” bogey). Moscow did not seek control over China (Khrushchev’s individual awkward initiatives that frightened Mao do not count), she needed him both as a partner in confrontation with the West and as an important participant in the new world economic system. Moreover, one of the main reasons for the then quarrel between Moscow and Beijing was precisely Khrushchev’s desire for dialogue with the United States, which Mao incorrectly regarded as preparations for the reorientation of the USSR from East to West, as a step towards China’s betrayal by Russia.
At that time, relations between the two countries were hindered not by the desire of one of them to subjugate the other (which, we repeat, did not exist), but by excessive ideologization and the resulting different assessments of the forces of the West and the potential of the “world revolution” (in Beijing they still believed in it, but in Moscow not anymore).
Now the situation is fundamentally different – and not because Russia and China have switched places in terms of economic power. What is more important is that our relations are based on healthy pragmatic realism, the coincidence of geopolitical interests (the restructuring of the world system, and not just “communism will defeat capitalism” or even “the East will overcome the West”) of our civilizational powers. And at the same time, the West is now in a worse situation than in the 50s and 60s. Despite all the initial successes of Atlantic globalization, it no longer works, and the West as a whole is on a downward trajectory, the balance of power in the non-Western world also plays into the hands of the Russia-China tie.
It is also extremely important that the non-Western world does not see either Moscow or Beijing as a contender for global domination, no matter what fairy tales the Anglo-Saxons tell on this subject. Kissinger also acknowledges China’s lack of claims to world domination, albeit with a sly proviso:
“I don’t believe world domination is a Chinese concept, but it could happen when they become so powerful. And it’s not in our interest.”
Ours is whose? Of course, this is unprofitable for the West, which is used to the fact that it is he who sets the rules of the game for the whole world. But that era is over, and neither China, nor Russia, nor a bunch of them are going to replace the West. The world is larger and more complex than the globalist schemes of the Anglo-Saxons – and they will definitely not be able to shove it back into the Procrustean bed of “one humanity under one leadership.”

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