EUGENE RUMER, RICHARD SOKOLSKY, PAUL STRONSKI
SUMMARY
Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic in recent decades have attracted increased attention from the West, as climate change opens up new opportunities for navigation and development of the natural resources of this region. Moscow, for its part, looks with great suspicion at what it sees as a challenge to its Arctic positions and plans from the US and NATO. The Kremlin’s statements about the West’s claims are sounding more and more harshly and are quite consistent with Russia’s policy of building up military power and implementing ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
DRIVING FORCES OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE ARCTIC
Russian interests in the Arctic are rooted deep in the past – in the 16th century, when the Russian state, driven by a constant desire to gain access to new natural resources and reliable trade routes, began the conquest of Siberia. Russia’s current policy in the Arctic is an integral component of the general confrontation with the West, in which Europe is the main theater of confrontation. Several factors underlie Russia’s formidable rhetoric and saber-rattling in the Arctic: preparations for an unlikely but potentially catastrophic war in Europe; the need to ensure the safety of its nuclear retaliatory strike potential, the bulk of which is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula region, and the search for resources to support the notorious “gun and butter” policy, since the confrontation with the West is clearly unabated.
AMBITION AND REALITY
The future will show whether Russia will succeed in realizing these ambitions. In its northwest, Russia’s nuclear and conventional naval forces are becoming increasingly vulnerable to NATO’s high-precision long-range weapons. The prospects for the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the northern maritime border of Russia and its transformation into the main sea route between Europe and Asia, as well as related commercial initiatives, are not entirely clear. How feasible and feasible these projects are in the long term, given the high costs and difficulties with logistics in such a harsh climate and very undeveloped infrastructure, growing trade competition from other countries, the lack of evidence of demand for hydrocarbons at a time when the world is switching to green technologies, as well as the likelihood that the West will impose new sanctions? The Kremlin is likely to will continue to build up its presence in the Arctic, as this line is clearly supported by President Vladimir Putin and key figures in government, military and business. However, Moscow’s ability to achieve these ambitious goals in the region appears to be at least controversial.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US AND NATO
The apparent contradiction between the Russian concept of security and NATO’s deterrence and collective defense commitments has caused serious tensions on the northern flank of the alliance, as the military forces of both sides are in close proximity to each other. As tempting as it may be to view the Arctic through the prism of great power competition – which would certainly be in line with Russia’s desire to be so – there is little to suggest that Russian military policy in the Arctic is a fundamentally new course. Rather, the Kremlin’s stance signifies a return to that Cold War strategy that focused on long-term missions to protect ballistic missile submarine areas and prepare for operations in the North Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe.
Russia claims serious rights to the Arctic – but despite the rhetoric, Moscow has so far acted legally in accordance with the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which it signed and ratified.
By its actions – aggressive statements and far-reaching territorial claims – Russia did little to improve its own diplomatic position relative to other Arctic states and only turned them against itself more strongly. The only partner of Russia in its interests in the Arctic is China, which has declared itself a “near-Arctic state.” But these claims by Beijing were not supported by the United States and most likely provoked a wary reaction from the Arctic countries.
Given the long-term nature of the confrontation between Russia and the West, a return to the relatively favorable geopolitical environment of the 1990s is unlikely. Moreover, the current situation is not due to misunderstanding, but to a sharp clash of interests of the two sides. This leaves only two options for resolving this conflict.
Diplomacy. While Russia is not willing to cooperate, the United States and NATO should find common ground, develop (as was the case during the Cold War) rules of the game to defuse tensions, avoid or overcome crises, and reduce the risk of conflicts arising from chance or mistakes.
Containment. The United States and NATO must continue to work on defense systems to, firstly, prevent Russia from harassing American military and passenger aircraft and ships in and around the Arctic, and secondly, to ensure that the alliance is able to implement the plan for military reinforcements on the northern and eastern flanks provided for in case of war.
The Alliance should continue to manage competition with Russia by combining tactics with determination and moderation, improving and demonstrating its defense and deterrent capabilities, but not overreacting to Russian muscle flexing. Finding a middle ground will be difficult; will have to clearly convey to Russia what the interests and goals of the alliance are and where the red line lies. The Allies have already gone through all this.
INTRODUCTION
In the first decade after the Cold War Russian Arctic considered as a zone of low intensity, which cooperate with other states for solving common problems welcomed and appeared achievable 1 . However, over time, as relations with the West deteriorated, and especially after the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Russia began to take a much more adversarial, if not confrontational, approach to the situation in the Arctic. Rather than focusing on the benefits of engagement and cooperation, Russian leaders have openly expressed their view of the Arctic as an area of military and economic expansion and an arena of great power ambitions …. As a result of this change, Moscow has made military superiority a priority to counter the reportedly growing threat to Russian interests in the Arctic from the United States and NATO.
According to any objective criteria, the US / NATO military presence in the Arctic does not currently threaten either the Russian Northern Fleet or other military facilities of the Russian Federation. The region is exceptionally rich in natural resources, primarily oil and gas, but there are such deposits in other parts of Russia as well. In the Arctic, exploration and production requires huge financial investments and the use of modern technologies, which can be an overwhelming burden for Russia. Global warming is opening up new market opportunities for shipping and fishing, but poor infrastructure in the region prevents them from taking full advantage of them, and major investments are needed to improve the situation.
Richard Sokolsky
Richard Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses on US policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.
Russia’s growing ambitions in the Arctic are causing growing concern among other Arctic states, although the basis of these ambitions is surprisingly obscure. Therefore, in this article we will consider the following questions: what factors determine Russian policy in the Arctic? How does Russia define its interests in the region and what tools does it use to advance them? Who in Russia will be the beneficiary of the development of the Arctic? What are the prospects for Russia to successfully implement its plans? What do its activities and ambitions mean in relation to the interests and policies of the United States and NATO?
FOR RUSSIA, STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC IS INSEPARABLE FROM STRATEGY IN EUROPE
During the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the Arctic has become an extremely important arena for Russian international, military and economic policy. The Kremlin’s interests in the region became apparent soon after the difficult period of the 1990s ended and the country gradually regained its active position on the world stage in the early 2000s.
LONG MULTIFACTORIAL HISTORY
The history of the Russian presence in the Arctic goes back several centuries. Most of Russia’s actions in the region have been supported and encouraged by governments, and have been geared towards developing trade and natural resource extraction. In the 20th century, the discovery of oil and gas in Siberia – both in the Arctic and south of the Arctic Circle – meant prosperity and hard currency, increased domestic consumption, financing of the Soviet military machine, and strengthening the economic foundation to advance Soviet interests abroad.
Post-Soviet Russia exploited Arctic natural resources even more actively. Oil and gas played a key role in restoring the country’s economic position in the early 2000s, guaranteeing stability, helping to cement Putin’s position as undisputed leader, and returning Russia to the world stage as a powerful great power determined to make up for its losses in Europe and claim its rights. to a worthy place in the system of international politics.
The role of oil and gas in Arctic Russia agenda was highlighted in 2006 as part of a Kremlin plan to approve Russia’s status as an “energy superpower” and as a basis for entry into the “Big Eight” 3 . Global warming facilitates access to these resources and provides the Kremlin with a stable source of income, as well as a market and geopolitical influence in Europe and Asia. In the absence of competitors capable of challenging its plans, Russia has tried to secure its geopolitical dominance in the Arctic.
Even the large-scale projected costs and technical difficulties associated with the exploration and production of resources on the Arctic shelf did not affect the Kremlin’s ambitions. It was assumed that the projects would be open to foreign energy companies with their technology and capital, and that those, as powerful stakeholders, would push Western governments to pursue policies favorable to Russia. Moreover, thanks to warming in the Arctic, the development of the Northern Sea Route along the Arctic coast of Russia should have allowed the Kremlin to diversify its energy policy, since, as expected, over time, the NSR will connect the Russian Arctic with markets in Asia, reducing the country’s dependence on Europe, a key energy market, and from Ukraine – an inevitable transit point on the way to this market4 .
Considering that 60% of Russia’s export earnings and about 30% of the federal budget are revenues from oil and gas sales, it is not hard to understand what is behind Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic. It was assumed that the proceeds from these projects would contribute to the solution of several priority tasks: the further confirmation of Putin as the leader who pulled Russia out of the abyss and restored its greatness; accumulation of funds as insurance against future economic or political crises; the revival of an army that had been neglected for many years and needed modernization.
TURNING THE WHEEL OF FORTUNE IN EUROPE
Europe has always been in the focus of Russian strategy. Russia’s desire to receive security guarantees and great power status, as well as to ensure that other European states recognize it as an equal player, has long been traced in how much Moscow cared about the depth and complexity of relations with the leading European countries. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s international influence fell and it was marginalized in the spheres of security, diplomacy and geopolitics 5… NATO’s eastward expansion has dealt a powerful blow to Russia’s longstanding ambitions and interests in Europe, especially the idea of strategic depth as a measure of the country’s physical security. NATO declared its responsibility for security in Europe, and, from Moscow’s point of view, this meant that the leading European countries – its historical opponents – would receive a voice and veto in NATO, while Russia would be left out.
By the end of the 2000s. Russian officials have increasingly expressed concern about the proximity of the alliance’s forces to the center of the country and the ongoing expansion of NATO, despite the fact that most of NATO’s military capabilities have been aimed at countering external threats not related to Russia. Moscow was especially concerned about the prospects of Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance, which the Kremlin viewed as an unacceptable step that clearly threatens the Russian Federation.
However, it was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 that led to a change in NATO’s strategy and the recognition of Russia as the main threat to the security of the alliance. In turn, NATO’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine has strengthened Russian perceptions of threats from the West. Recent mass protests in Belarus have also increased in the Russian sense of vulnerability, casting doubt on the reliability of Minsk as an ally in the event of a major conflict with NATO, 6 .
Russia’s investment in energy projects in the Arctic is part of a broader strategy for Europe and the world as a whole, but Europe remains the main arena in the Kremlin’s strategic calculations. The revenues from these investments help maintain a level of defense capability that balances NATO, while year-round Arctic navigation and shipping routes to Asia will reduce dependence on Europe, which is perceived as a hostile side, determined to contain Russia through a military build-up at its borders and more economic sanctions 7 .
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC
Russia has three key military needs in the Arctic. The main one is to ensure the possibility of a retaliatory strike by submarines with ballistic missiles on board (strategic missile submarine cruisers, SSBNs) in the event of a conflict with NATO 8 . Seven of the eleven ballistic missile submarines in Russia are stationed on the Kola Peninsula. Security concerns at these sites are driving efforts to improve the A2 / AD (Restricted and Denied of Access and Maneuvering) and tracking and surveillance capabilities, the increasing intensity of strategic exercises and aerial patrols by long-range bombers and anti-submarine aircraft, and the modernization of military infrastructure designed to support all these operations 9 .
The second need, partly related to the first, is the preservation of Russia’s ability to operate in the North Atlantic and the European Arctic in the event of a conflict with NATO. Only the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy has access to the Barents and Norwegian Seas, as well as to the Atlantic Ocean. And the ability to conduct operations in these territories could decide the outcome of the conflict on the eastern flank of NATO 10 .
Finally, the third need is military protection for Russia’s growing economic development, investment and trade interests in the Arctic. The huge size of the region, long and open borders, which are protected only by their inaccessibility and harsh climate, poor communication and infrastructure and harsh natural conditions in general, the intensification of activities on the territory not related to military tasks – all this increases the danger of sea transport, nuclear accidents and environmental disasters, which means that the need to be able to quickly deploy a rapid reaction force here is also growing.
Consistent with these interests is Russia’s peacetime military presence in the Arctic and the allocation of resources to strengthen military capabilities and improve infrastructure in the region. Maintaining a dominant military presence in the Arctic is seen as a necessary element of Russia’s strategy in the region, given the Kremlin’s priorities in Europe and its strained relations with the West, NATO’s military build-up near the border with Russia, and Western sanctions aimed at limiting Russia’s exploration and production activities. energy resources in the Arctic.
ECONOMY AND ENERGY
Sparsely populated Russian territories in the Arctic provide 10% of the country’s gross domestic product and about 20% of exports. Most of the raw material wealth comes from hydrocarbons, but there are also non-ferrous and precious metals, stones and other minerals 11 . About a third of all fish caught in Russia is caught in Arctic waters, which makes them an important source of food. The Russian government hopes to increase this share by 2030, as ocean warming forces fish to migrate north 12 .
The development of these resources is in the economic interests of Russia, but it will require a very expensive and complex transport infrastructure – roads, railways, air and sea links to connect the Arctic with other territories inside and outside the country. New icebreaking capabilities, ports, weather stations and emergency services will also be needed. The creation of such an infrastructure is Moscow’s second priority economic task in the region.
Finally, Russia hopes to transform the northern coast into the Northern Sea Route, a shipping corridor through Arctic waters. At present, the NSR is open for navigation without icebreaker escort only in the summer months and is used mainly by Russian vessels to deliver Arctic resources to Asian markets. However, as stated in the Strategy of development of the Arctic zone of Russia, adopted in 2020, Russia intends by 2035 to turn the Northern Sea Route in the competitive Asian-European Maritime Corridor 13 .
RUSSIAN TOOLS
Russia solves its tasks in the Arctic, skillfully and consistently using a solid arsenal of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and informational means.
MARITIME LAW
Russia signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the United States refused to ratify. The Russian Federation claims a significant part of the Arctic seabed as its exclusive economic zone, justifying this by the fact that the geological structure of the continental shelf falls under the terms of the convention 14 . The UN rejected the first Russian application for technical reasons in 2001, and in 2015 Moscow submitted another 15… The position outlined in it contradicts the positions formulated in the applications of Canada and Denmark, but if Russian claims are satisfied, the Russian Federation will receive exclusive rights to exploit the natural resources of the seabed of a very large part of the Arctic Ocean. Pending a decision, the Kremlin is holding bilateral talks with Canada and Denmark, trying to find ways to reconcile positions.
REGIONAL DIPLOMACY
In matters of regional diplomacy, Russia relies on the Arctic Council – the main international forum to promote coordination and cooperation in the region 16 . The council includes eight Arctic countries, organizations representing the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, as well as several states (including China) and organizations with observer status. According to the declaration of the Arctic Council, signed in 1996 in Ottawa, its competence includes issues related to cooperation in the field of environmental protection, scientific research and ensuring sustainable development of the circumpolar regions 17, but the council cannot deal with issues of military security. In May 2021, the two-year chairmanship of the Council passes to Russia. Moscow promises to implement regional cooperation initiatives aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, attracting investment and improving the living conditions of indigenous peoples 18 . Russia always strives to show itself as an influential player on the world stage and will undoubtedly use its chairmanship to create an image of a supporter of soft power in the Arctic, even if in the end it does not achieve real success in solving environmental problems or indigenous peoples’ rights.
Russia is also a member of the Arctic Five, a forum that brings together the coastal states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States – and does not include any other international and non-governmental actors 19 . The Arctic Five meets as needed, most often at other international meetings, and its agenda is mainly focused on shipping, fisheries management and the study of competing claims to the continental shelf. Not being an official body, the forum has a flexible policy regarding the issues under consideration.
ECONOMY
Despite limited resources and a weak economy, Russia has allocated impressive funds for the implementation of a large-scale program in the Arctic and is pursuing a non-trivial fiscal policy in this area. The government has offered tax breaks to large energy, mining and infrastructure companies if they invest in the region. This is especially true for the territories of the Eastern and Siberian Arctic, in the development of which much less effort was previously invested than in the development of the Arctic regions west of the Urals 20 .
Some of these perks are certainly intended for companies that have close ties to the Kremlin. For example, in 2019 the government announced Rosneft tax breaks of $ 41 billion for a period of 30 years for the Vostok Oil project, a field capable of producing 2 million barrels of oil per day 21 . Potential investors from India and China, which Rosneft intended to attract, demanded similar benefits as a precondition for their participation in the project, but, according to available information, no agreement has yet been reached 22 .
In 2020, the government approved a program providing tax incentives size of over $ 300 billion for Arctic projects related to the construction of infrastructure facilities, production of liquefied natural gas, and oil and gas extraction 23 . In addition, to attract domestic and foreign investors, incentives have been promised to companies engaged in the petrochemical, mining and forestry industries 24 . The aim of all these measures – to stimulate economic activity and the construction of cities, power plants, ports and airports, as well as to stop the outflow of population from the region 25 .
HARD POWER
The Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy is Moscow’s main military tool in the Arctic. It is designed to guard strategic missile submarine cruisers and Arctic borders, strengthen the status of a great power, reinforce claims to land and resources, protect economic interests and infrastructure, and, finally, serve as a counteraction and deterrent against a military build-up by NATO member and partner countries. as well as neutral countries that, according to the Kremlin, threaten Russia’s interests in the region 26 .
The importance of the Northern Fleet is also confirmed by organizational changes that have raised its status. In 2014, the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command was created, whose main task is to ensure the protection of existing and future military facilities located along the NSR. The formation of the Arctic Brigade was a key element of this reorganization. In January 2021, the Northern Fleet officially became the fifth military district of Russia – this is the first time that the fleet was equated in status with military district 27 .
All of these important changes are in line with the Kremlin’s 2017 announcement that the capacity of the Northern Fleet is being brought in line with the goal of “driving NATO out of the Arctic” 28 . The fleet received more powerful warships, missile and artillery installations; four new combat brigades; a land motorized rifle brigade; advanced air defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, command, control, communications and computer support systems, reconnaissance and surveillance systems 29 . Constructed and upgraded facilities to ensure enhanced logistical support for the force and the navy, which is scheduled to enter more than fifty icebreakers 30 .
Judging by the pace and scale of the modernization program, Russia does not seek either naval dominance in the region or the creation of a real ocean-going fleet. Much of this potential is not intended to showcase Russian combat power, but rather for perimeter defense and border guards. Infrastructure expansion is aimed primarily at non-military tasks such as search and rescue operations or protecting investments in maritime transport, energy and the economy.
Nevertheless, the military power of Russia and its activities in the Arctic initially have offensive potential and used threatening way 31 . Air and naval forces undertake provocative maneuvers to intimidate NATO countries on the northern and eastern flanks; increased naval, submarine and air patrols near the territories of Denmark and Norway; surprise military exercises are being held in the region; increasingly aggressive tactics of jamming US naval and air operations off the coast of Alaska 32… Moreover, many of the objects along the Northern Sea Route are dual purpose and Russian steps to improve safety and security at sea – modernization of radar and communication, or the construction of new drone bases – endow these systems with offensive capabilities 33 .
The main efforts of Russia are aimed at protecting the territory and seas around the Kola Peninsula and preventing US / NATO troops from entering the region. Expanding defense in depth would require deploying forces across the Faroe-Icelandic line, which in turn would pose a clear threat to NATO’s maritime lines of communication and aircraft carrier strike groups 34… Most important, perhaps, Russia’s intentions could change if US / NATO actions – for example, the deployment of more advanced missile defense or anti-submarine systems in the region or in the neighborhood – create a heightened sense of threat in Moscow. If this happens, the Kremlin will have additional incentives to choose from a defense-oriented strategy one that is more offensive-oriented and based on broader display of power.
INFORMATION SUPPORT
To draw attention to its own achievements in the Arctic and to help achieve its goals in the region, the Kremlin launched an information campaign. In 2007, the expedition planted a Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean near the North Pole, thereby symbolically declaring Russian claims to the Arctic 35 . High-ranking officials are periodically captured in high-profile photographs taken during inspections of military, energy and scientific facilities in the Arctic 36 . Senior officials and companies organize highly publicized international Arctic meetings 37 . One of these events took place in 2016 aboard the Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker 38… Major companies, including Rosneft, Norilsk Nickel and Gazprom, sponsor the Arctic – Territory of Dialogue International Arctic Forum, which has been held since 2010 in St. Petersburg and attended by Putin 39 .
PARTIES CONCERNED
Rich reserves of the Arctic oil and gas make it a strategically important region, not only for the Russian economy, but also for those key players of the Kremlin, who represents the business world and is one of Putin’s inner circle 40 . State economic interests in the Arctic are intertwined with the interests of the ruling elite.
The largest of the parties with economic interests in the Arctic is the energy industry. Energy companies lacking capital and lacking subsea technologies for field development are attracting foreign partners. In 2011, the state-owned company Rosneft, led by Putin’s old ally Igor Sechin, entered into a strategic cooperation agreement with ExxonMobil, which has extensive experience in the development of natural resources in the Canadian Arctic and their exploitation in the Kara Sea 41 . Both companies agreed to invest $ 3.2 billion in the project (to share risks) and share technologies for offshore development; drilling started a year later 42… However, ExxonMobil was forced to withdraw from the project in 2014 after the United States imposed sanctions prohibiting Western companies from participating in Russian oil production projects in Arctic offshore fields. In 2020, Rosneft itself resumed drilling with the support of the Kremlin 43 .
The largest independent natural gas producer in Russia, Novatek, whose main shareholder is Gennady Timchenko, also closely associated with Putin, owns a controlling stake in Yamal LNG. This is the loudest Arctic project and, at the same time, an example of Russian-Chinese trade cooperation 44 . After sanctions against Novatek limited Western funding for the project and technology transfer, China National Petroleum Corporation and the China State Investment Fund joined in. Chinese companies now have a 30 percent stake in the project, while France’s Total owns 20 percent of the 45… Novatek is building another plant with financial support from China and plans to build another in the Russian Far North 46 .
In 2018, Rosatom, the state-owned atomic energy corporation, was assigned to oversee cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route and was assigned a key role in the development of infrastructure along this route 47 . In addition, Rosatom was entrusted with the construction and supervision of a nuclear icebreaker fleet. The Corporation will manage emergency response in the Russian Arctic and develop communications and navigation infrastructure along the entire NSR 48 . The important role of Rosatom in the Arctic has contributed to the growth of the company’s political influence, an increase in its funding from budgetary funds, as well as the diversification of its activities, which now extends to the transport and logistics sectors 49 .
Finally, the key players in the Arctic are the defense and security sector and its leaders. Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s closest ally and former FSB director, is an ardent supporter of expanding Russia’s presence in the Arctic and showing the world its achievements. In 2020, the Security Council established a special commission to ensure the national interests of the Russian Federation in the region 50 . The commission is chaired by the country’s former President Dmitry Medvedev, and includes defense and foreign ministers, high-ranking executive and judicial officials, and major regional officials 51… Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu opened in favor of the expansion of Russia’s military presence in the Arctic in order to protect its interests against threats from hostile neighbors 52 .
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA
Despite the ambitious plans of the Russian government and corporations to attract foreign investors to implement projects related to the use of natural resources in the Arctic, success is far from guaranteed. Oil and gas, which are assigned a central role in these plans, are also found in large quantities in other, more accessible and comfortable regions, where their production and transportation are much less expensive. List of Russian made ambitious programs, even those who supported Putin himself, does not inspire much hope 53 . Large corporations with good connections in the Kremlin, such as Rosatom or Rosneft, can count on impressive government subsidies, but many projects that do not have high-level political support will not receive funding and will not be implemented 54… Even in the Arctic, which the authorities are now paying as much attention, and they would have to be given priority in the allocation of resources, major projects do not get or do not get enough cash 55 .
There are several other factors beyond Moscow’s control that could cloud Russia’s prospects in the Arctic. The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the global economy was also reflected in a decrease in demand for oil and gas 56 . COVID-19 has hit European economies hard, and now Europe – a key market for Russian gas – has an ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing its carbon footprint. But in any case, as a result of EU energy reforms, it will now be more difficult for Russian producers to maintain their positions in the European energy market 57 .
Russia plans to increase its export of liquefied natural gas to the Asian market, especially to China, but the success of these initiatives is also questionable. High prices for LNG, the length of the Northern Sea Route and difficult navigation conditions, the likelihood of new sanctions by the United States, the toughness and intransigence of the Chinese side in the negotiation process – all this can become a significant obstacle to the implementation of Russian plans . 58
By themselves, the size, desert and climatic conditions of Russian regions in the Arctic pose a big problem for the development of infrastructure, the creation of new settlements and for economic activity in general. Erected, as a rule, at the expense of slave labor during the Stalin years, cities suffer from high levels of poverty and unemployment 59 . The brightest and most skilled townspeople leave 60 , and it will take more than just a paycheck that they can get elsewhere to keep these people. In addition, climate change and melting permafrost are significantly worsening living and working conditions in the region. Both have a detrimental effect on the state of the existing infrastructure, roads and buildings and lead to a sharp increase in the number of industrial and transport accidents.61 .
The future of the Northern Sea Route is also vague in the role of the main transport corridor between Europe and Asia prescribed by enthusiasts. Insurance of shipping in polar waters is extremely expensive, as is the escort of cargo by icebreakers. In 2020, 331 ships were supposed to pass through a limited section of the NSR, but only 62 of them overcame the planned route to the end, carrying 26 million tons of cargo, which is significantly less than Moscow’s declared goal of 80 million tons by 2024. 62 .
Even the prospects for a Russian military presence in the Arctic are not entirely certain. The tasks of protecting the northern borders and the military and economic infrastructure in the region, as well as guaranteeing the security of the area of deployment of strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs), cannot be considered unconditionally secured in the event of a conflict with NATO. Plans to modernize weapons and create new infrastructure are likely to run into the same resource constraints and the same management challenges that impede Russia’s other Arctic programs 63 . At best, the implementation of these plans will be slowed down, and at worst, it will be too costly and overwhelming for the defense budget, especially if the hopes for high revenues from the sale of oil and gas are not justified.
Russia has already had to postpone plans to form a second Arctic brigade, designed to strengthen coastal defenses 64 . Moreover, the Northern Fleet is experiencing a shortage of icebreakers and ice-going vessels, military transport, tanker aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft 65 . If this deficit is not filled with adequate investment, the fleet’s ability to conduct wider-range operations beyond the reach of SSBNs will be severely limited.
Whether Russia will be able to secure an advantage in the conflict with NATO in the Arctic and Baltic is an open question. On the one hand, the Baltic states are cut off from the rest of the alliance, and in the event of a conflict, military support or deployment of troops on their territory will be extremely difficult and will require a large-scale military operation that is highly vulnerable to Russian opposition. Moreover, the undoubted advantage for Moscow will be the small size of the Baltic countries and their proximity to the main Russian military installations and garrisons, as well as its superiority in terms of the number of icebreakers and ice navigation vessels, as well as local infrastructure, technologies for operations in cold conditions and preparation for them 66 .
On the other hand, the geography of the Baltic region can create serious problems for Russia 67 . The proximity to the Baltic states of Russia’s main military installations makes them vulnerable to NATO’s long-range precision missiles launched from the air or from floating platforms. The probability that in case of war the Russian fleet will be able to get out of the Gulf of Finland, is in doubt 68 . The Kaliningrad enclave, which contains the impressive Russian military forces, is cut off from the rest of the country and will also be vulnerable to NATO strikes.
Russia’s aggressive policy in the Arctic and Baltic provoked NATO to take actions that, in a crisis situation, could turn against it and become a threat to its security and interests. In February 2021, the United States temporarily deployed an expeditionary squadron of B-1 Lancer bombers in Norway with 200 personnel 69 . In September 2020, the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Norway conducted joint exercises just 100 miles off Russia’s 70 coastline . In March 2021, NATO units from Norway, Great Britain and the United States and several other countries, as well as units from Sweden and Finland, conducted exercises in the north of Norway according to the scenario of “high-intensity hostilities” 71 .
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US / NATO
The accusations and warnings that NATO and Russia are exchanging about the threat each side poses to the other risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The situation is reminiscent of the classic “security dilemma”, when measures taken by one state to ensure its own security force other states to take retaliatory measures, as a result of which the security level of the first country only decreases 72 . This is very risky. The mutual commitments of NATO member states and the Russian vision of the necessary conditions for their security, which focuses on strategic depth and buffer zones that can protect against a perceived threat, clash on the northern flank of the alliance.
Direct military confrontation in the Arctic will not be limited to the territory of the region and is fraught with disastrous consequences for both sides. All actors in the Arctic have a clear interest in avoiding such an outcome, whether as a result of deliberate or unintentional escalation. The latter is a more likely scenario, and its risk is likely to increase as opposing parties operate in close proximity to each other.
Either way, neither side shows a willingness to retreat. For NATO, it is about maintaining confidence in mutual defense commitments, for Russia – about an adversary who has approached state borders and does not want to agree with the requirements regarding security, geopolitics and economics, which, in its opinion, Moscow has the right to put forward.
SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFRONTATION
It is not easy to ignore Russian rhetoric, deliberate provocations and loud statements about plans in the Arctic and threats to them – and it is difficult to admit that so far the Kremlin is formidable only in words. Russia lacks the capacity to implement its ambitious plans. Therefore, it is now important not to yield to Moscow’s onslaught and at the same time refrain from overreacting to it.
Despite the seeming novelty of the situation – climate change, NATO’s entry into new frontiers in Eastern Europe, the expansion of China’s presence in the Arctic, etc. – Russia’s claims to the High North and their justification are part of a long-standing historical trend. Opposition to the West is also not new, and claims to Arctic resources are critical to being able to maintain their positions. From the point of view of the Russian security services, Russia is playing on defense rather than offense.
In addition, Russia is confronting the West in an extremely unfavorable situation for itself. The economy is stagnant, the population is shrinking, the country is in diplomatic isolation – and mainly because of its own actions. Russia has rebuilt its military capabilities after a long period of decline, but even in this priority national area there is a lack of funding and technological problems. In the coming years, Russia’s activity and strategy in the Arctic will most likely be conditioned by the desire to maintain its already weakened position in the confrontation with the West.
Rather than viewing the Arctic as an arena for great power competition with Russia, the United States and other Arctic NATO members should adopt a two-pronged strategy of diplomacy and containment.
Diplomacy
While Russia may be intractable, the United States and NATO should consider entering into multilateral agreements that will reduce tensions, prevent or manage crises, and reduce the risk of conflicts arising from an accident or miscalculation.
Currently, there is no platform for dialogue on security issues in the Arctic. This gap can be filled by bringing together Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway and giving them the task of managing crises, mitigating risks and preventing conflicts, even if Russia’s unwillingness to seriously address these issues raises doubts about the viability of such a platform in the near future.
Containment
The United States and NATO must strengthen their defenses to keep Russia from harassing their military and merchant aircraft and ships in and around the Arctic. Also, they need to make sure that the Alliance retains the ability to act on the northern and eastern flanks of the power according to plan reinforcements provided for in the event of war 73 .
The Alliance should adhere to the current strategy of restraint and determination, demonstrating to Russia that NATO’s plans do not include offensive operations, but that the alliance is nevertheless fully prepared to defend its interests. Staying within this framework will not be easy and will require NATO to clearly and clearly identify its interests, goals and critical points of disagreement to Russia.
CONCLUSION
As a response to Russian claims in the Arctic, it will be extremely important for the United States and NATO to base their plans on a realistic assessment of Russia’s strategy, its capabilities in the region, and the driving forces behind its policies. As tempting as it may be to view the Arctic through the prism of great power competition – which would certainly be in line with Russia’s desire to be such – there is little to suggest that Moscow’s military policy in the Arctic is a fundamentally new course. Rather, the Kremlin’s position signifies a return to that Cold War strategy that focused on the long-term mission of protecting ballistic missile submarine areas and conducting operations in the North Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. Now Russia is applying this approach again, but it already has fewer resources,
A certain level of protection against a greater than expected threat from Russia should become for the United States and NATO one of the elements of a common approach to the problem of the Arctic region. But the desire to bypass Russia in the competition of great powers in this region may distract from solving other, more important tasks for the United States. In protecting its core interests in the Arctic, the Alliance should act with prudence, realism and restraint; caution is needed to avoid the destabilizing effects of competition with Russia.
While this tense confrontation is likely to continue, some cooperation between Russia and other Arctic states in practical areas, mostly unrelated to politics, is quite possible. These areas include climate change, search and rescue operations and scientific research. Opportunities can also be sought for cooperation on issues of common interest, such as maritime safety, environmental remediation, fisheries protection and emergency response. It is also imperative for NATO Allies to seek diplomatic opportunities to manage confrontation by developing a set of rules to reduce the risk of escalating crises and incidents 74… Even if they seem ghostly, it is necessary to look for such opportunities. The Allies have already gone through all this.
Courtesy: (carnegie.ru)
