Some actors do want escalation in ME

Kerry Boyd Anderson

Last week, during a trip to the Middle East, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “escalation is in no one’s interest. No one’s seeking it.” But is that true? One challenge to considering this question is that escalation is often more of a dial than a switch – parties to the conflict can turn their engagement in violence up or down, rather than simply on or off. This makes it difficult to know how to define escalation in a particular conflict. In the current case, all-out war between multiple states in the region is very unlikely, but dialing up violence in ways that increase the scale and breadth of fighting is a serious risk.
As the Biden administration seeks to avoid escalation, its own ally is its biggest obstacle. Key figures within Israel’s government clearly see themselves as benefiting from an intensification and escalation of the war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has a personal interest in escalating the war. He faces corruption and other charges in court and his efforts to weaken the judiciary led to large-scale protests before the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. His political reputation has largely been based on providing security, but he failed to prevent the worst attack in Israel’s history.
An Israeli poll in December found that only 15 percent of Israelis want Netanyahu to remain as prime minister after the war. Netanyahu has an interest in buying time before facing a postwar reckoning and his best chance to turn around his fortunes is to achieve sufficient military victories over Hamas and Hezbollah so that Israelis believe he has restored and strengthened their security. Netanyahu’s right-wing allies, including many senior government officials, also have an interest in intensifying and potentially expanding the war. The right wing of Israeli politics has openly embraced the opportunity that the war in Gaza presents to displace many Palestinians and crush any remaining hopes for a Palestinian state. Current senior leaders such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter – as well as multiple former senior officials and a policy proposal from the Israeli Intelligence Ministry – have called for moving Gazans to Egypt.
Furthermore, the Israeli military has created facts on the ground in Gaza – including the destruction of more than half of the Strip’s buildings, crucial infrastructure and even cultural sites – that will make it difficult for Palestinians to ever return to normal life there. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, right-wing politicians, settlers and the military have used the world’s focus on Gaza to significantly ramp up efforts to displace Palestinians and assert Israeli control. Since Oct. 7, at least 332 Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have been killed and multiple communities and families displaced, according to the UN.
The threats to Palestinian lives and property predate Oct. 7, but Israeli military raids and settler attacks have spiked in the last 100 days. The ongoing war in Gaza and potentially an expansion to Lebanon could provide cover for right-wing efforts to diminish Palestinian communities and move toward annexing the West Bank. US officials have expressed concern that Iran and its allies will widen the war, but Tehran and its partners have reasons to be satisfied with how things have gone so far while avoiding intensification.
Despite Gazans’ extreme suffering, Hamas can claim some success. It put the Palestinian cause back in the global limelight, derailed efforts to expand normalization between Israel and Arab states, damaged Israel’s reputation, proved its relevance and forced Israel to release some Palestinian prisoners. Polls suggest that Palestinian support for Hamas has increased (for now). However, Hamas has little ability to escalate further. The Iranian regime and Hezbollah have used the opportunity to demonstrate their ongoing commitment to resistance against Israel while distracting attention from their own domestic problems. These allies, plus Iranian partners in Iraq and Syria, benefit from the opportunity to work together, as well as from the growing isolation of Israel and the US on the world stage.
However, it is not clear that Iran and its allies want further escalation. A major war that could weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon would not suit their interests. The best outcome for these actors is a low-level, ongoing conflict that weakens Israel and damages Washington’s reputation without entering into a major war with Israel and the US’ far more powerful militaries. Nonetheless, unintentional escalation is a real risk. Among Iran’s allies, the Houthis might have the most interest in escalation. They have taken advantage of the situation to broaden their cause and demand global attention. They might calculate that they can survive US strikes and that most Yemenis will blame Washington, while the Houthis bolster their reputation.
There are actors that see escalation as in their interests. There are others that do not want escalation but could benefit from ongoing conflict. Of course, there are those that want neither escalation nor continuing war, especially the many civilians in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere who bear the brunt of the cost and have nothing to gain. Many Israeli civilians – especially the families of hostages – have no interest in escalation.
The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon do not want war with Israel. Anyone with an interest in regional stability and international shipping does not want escalation. Avoiding escalation requires acknowledging that some powerful actors would welcome it. The question going forward is whether the many civilians and leaders who have a genuine interest in avoiding escalation can overcome the agendas of those who might benefit.