The Anglo-Saxon game against Moscow

Written by The Frontier Post

Petr Akopov

The European Union has decided to grant Ukraine the status of a candidate member of the EU. It took a serious effort to get all 27 countries to agree to this, although it is clear that the candidacy does not guarantee subsequent entry into the European Union. It is enough to look at the almost quarter-century example of Turkey. Moreover, it can be confidently stated that Ukraine will never become part of the EU. Until recently, this was clear even to the majority of European elites.
But now they are pretending that it is necessary to politically and morally support “heroic Ukraine resisting Russian aggression”, and granting candidate status (even with a lot of reservations that the path to the EU will take deca-des) will be the right gesture. And a signal to Mos-cow : this is potentially our territory, retreat from it, we are laying our rights on it. But this is precisely the main reason for everything that is happening in Ukra-ine – the claims of Europe, the West to someone else’s.
Although Vladimir Putin recently at the St. Peter-sburg forum spoke more than aloofly about granting Ukraine a candidate status – they say, this is not our business, because this is not a military bloc – it is clear that Russia is far from be-ing indifferent to Europe’s claims to the Square. Mo-reover, it was the preparation for the signing of an association agreement be-tween the EU and Ukraine that became the last straw that overflowed the bowl of Ukrainian balancing betw-een Europe and Russia. In the autumn of 2013, Putin had to convince Yanukov-ych to postpone the signing of the association, and everything began: Maidan, coup, Crimea and Donbass. The association agreement, by the way, was signed by the new government in March 2014 (the economic part – in June), that is, they were in a hurry to designate the “European choice”.
At the same time, no one was going to accept Ukraine into the EU – and not at all because it was not ready for one or another indicator. The main reason was and remains one thing: Europe understands that Ukraine is someone else’s. A foreign civilization, a for-eign geopolitical space, and not just a foreign one, but a part of a foreign one. That is, of course, Europe would not mind including in its sphere of influence (not in the composition – this is a matter of the distant future) part of the Russian world, but not at the expense of a break with Russia, and even more so a war with it. What has changed in the last four months since the beginning of the special military operation?
Hasn’t Europe made sure that Russia always comes for its own? Has the resistance of the current Ukrainian state whetted the appetite and hopes to defeat Russia are not purely propaganda, but real? And Europe believes in its ability not only to preserve Ukraine in its current form, but also to tear it away from Russia forever, to secure the shifting of the borders of Europe and the Russian world? One can still understand when the Poles dream about this with their eternal inferiority complex in front of their older Slavic relative, but how can Western Europeans, Germans and French, who have repeatedly convinced themselves of the futility of trying to move the border of Europe to the east, hope for this?
All these questions would be of fundamental importance if there was someone to ask them, but today’s Europe cannot answer them. When, after the Second World War, the main people of the continent, the Germans, lost their geopolitical and ideological sovereignty, Europe became a hostage of interests – Anglo-Saxon control over it changed its forms and strength, but remained the main factor determining its course. Geopolitical — military and ideological — dependence does not leave Europe the right to make a truly independent choice, although the work to create the European Union could sooner or later lead to the restoration of the sovereignty of the Old World, albeit at the level of the continental, not the state.
Such a sovereign Europe could take place only in the presence of non-hostile, and even better (for her) good-neighborly relations with Russia, which cannot simply be ignored and even more so isolated from Eur-ope. All reasonable Europe-an strategists understood this, even those who dealt with the Soviet Union, w-hich in the West was represented as a power with he-gemonic inclinations. But the USSR gained control o-ver Eastern Europenot bec-ause of their communist go-als, but after repulsing the deadly attack of a “united Europe”. And after the collapse of the Union and our departure from Eastern Eu-rope, nothing prevented us from building normal mut-ually beneficial relations – provided that the Europe-ans observed only one condition. Do not perceive the collapse of historical Russia, the USSR as a victory over us and do not try to reconsider the borders of Europe and the Russian world. Was there a chance for it? Yes, but only if Europe were independent. But, alas, Atlantic control (not only through NATO, but also through pro-Atlantic cadres in the EU) turned out to be stronger than the feelings of national memory and the national interests of the Europeans.
As a result, the EU was forced to identify its claims to Ukraine and enter into a war with Russia on its territory. This destroyed European-Russian relations – and what will Europe get for this? Ukraine or its remnants? No, Russia will not allow this, because it understands perfectly well that the EU is becoming a screen for the Anglo-Saxon game against Moscow.
Maybe the EU will at least strengthen its unity by rallying against the “Russian threat”? But this unity cannot long rest on fear of Russia – as soon as it begins to subside and the Western European countries try to improve relations with our country (no Russophilia – just business), they will immediately begin to be crushed by the Russophobic faction in the EU (supported by the Anglo-Saxons). Moreover, they will put pressure not just on the Russian theme, but on the principles of European integration.
And the most important question: why should Europe lay claim to Ukraine if there is virtually no chance of getting it? Joe Biden said on Tuesday that “at some point it will turn into a game of expectations – in terms of what the Russians can endure and what Europe will be ready to endure.” But there is no intrigue here, because the stakes are fundamentally different. Russia is returning its own, while Europe is playing someone else’s game (and understands this), while claiming someone else’s (besides, not being sure that it will get it). Who in this situation is ready to endure more, who is ready to go to the end? If Europe does not want or cannot now honestly answer this question for itself, then there is simply nothing to talk about with it.

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