Why a US–Iran nuclear deal now seems more likely than ever

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

In a critical diplomatic development, officials from Iran and the United States recently concluded a second round of indirect nuclear negotiations. These talks, mediated by Oman and held in Rome, were described by both sides as “positive” and indicative of “progress.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US envoy Steve Witkoff led the discussions, with both parties agreeing to begin expert-level negotiations aimed at building a framework for a potential deal. This shift in tone and engagement contrasts sharply with the atmosphere just a few months ago, when tensions between the two nations were at a boiling point. The fact that both sides are now openly discussing progress seems to mark a significant step forward in the fraught relationship.

This change is particularly striking considering how unlikely any agreement seemed earlier this year. At that time, the rhetoric between Tehran and Washington was at its most confrontational in years. President Trump repeatedly warned of potential military action, and Iran had escalated its uranium enrichment program in defiance of previous accords. Public exchanges between the two governments were laced with threats and accusations. Yet diplomatic efforts were underway; What once seemed politically unthinkable is now emerging as a real possibility, suggesting that both sides may have reassessed the costs of continued hostility.

History shows that a nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States is only possible when both parties have the political will to reach one. This mutual desire must be underpinned by tangible benefits for both sides. During the Obama administration, this dynamic led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). At that time, President Obama sought a major foreign policy legacy and an alternative to military confrontation, while Iran was desperate for relief from crushing economic sanctions. That alignment of incentives enabled the two sides to negotiate a landmark deal. The same logic may be unfolding today: a deal is not born out of idealism or goodwill, but out of strategic self-interest.

From the perspective of the Trump administration, there are several overlapping motivations to pursue an agreement with Iran. First and foremost, such a deal could be framed as a significant foreign policy victory – one that demonstrates the administration’s ability to resolve complex international challenges without committing US troops to another war. In a political climate where achievements are closely tied to popularity, the optics of defusing a long-standing nuclear standoff through tough diplomacy could be a major boost. The administration could position itself as having succeeded where previous presidents failed, crafting a better deal that supposedly puts more pressure on Iran while keeping American interests intact.

Additionally, a nuclear deal could help the administration avoid a military conflict that would be both unpopular and costly. Despite the bellicose rhetoric, there is little public appetite for another war in the Middle East, especially after the protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. A military campaign against Iran would not only be financially draining, but it would also risk dragging the US into a broader regional conflict involving Iranian proxies in Iraq and elsewhere. By striking a deal, the administration can argue that it preserved American lives and taxpayer dollars, opting for strategic negotiation over brute force while still maintaining a firm posture toward Tehran.

Moreover, Trump’s frequent warnings and ultimatums may be part of a calculated strategy designed to extract concessions from Iran. Rather than signaling an intent to launch military strikes, the administration’s aggressive tone could be aimed at bringing Iran to the negotiating table under duress. By portraying itself as willing to take drastic action, the US increases pressure on Tehran to make compromises it might otherwise resist. This method of “negotiation through intimidation” has been a recurring feature of Trump’s diplomatic style, and it could now be serving its intended purpose – laying the groundwork for a deal that the administration can present as a hard-won triumph achieved through strength and resolve.

Iran, for its part, also finds itself in urgent need of a deal, driven by mounting internal and external pressures. The Iranian economy has been brought to its knees by years of US-led sanctions targeting its oil exports, financial institutions, and critical industries. Inflation is rampant, unemployment is high, and the value of the rial – the national currency – has plummeted. The country’s middle class, once seen as a potential driver of moderation and reform, has been hollowed out by economic despair. With domestic unrest brewing and protests becoming more frequent, Iran’s leadership is aware that a deal could provide not just economic relief, but also political breathing room.

Beyond economic concerns, Iran is deeply worried about the security of its nuclear program, which it regards as its ultimate deterrent against foreign invasion or regime change. Tehran has invested heavily – politically, financially, and technologically – in developing its nuclear infrastructure. But that infrastructure remains highly vulnerable to airstrikes from Israel or even preemptive US military action. By reaching a deal that includes guarantees or limits on foreign intervention, Iran could preserve the essence of its deterrent capability while avoiding the destruction of its facilities and the devastation that would follow a military confrontation. The broader regional picture also pushes Iran toward the negotiating table. A nuclear deal, then, becomes more than a way to ease economic sanctions – it’s also a tool to stabilize Iran’s crumbling regional posture and reduce the immediate threats to its core strategic assets.

A convergence of interests now appears to be taking shape. On one hand, the Trump administration wants to claim a foreign policy win without getting entangled in another war. On the other hand, Iran is looking for an off-ramp from economic collapse and regional marginalization. This alignment does not guarantee success, but it creates the necessary conditions for progress. Negotiations of this scale and complexity only succeed when both parties genuinely believe they have something to gain and are prepared to make difficult concessions.

In conclusion, while a deal between the United States and Iran seemed implausible just a month ago, it now appears more achievable than ever. The mutual desire to avoid further conflict, combined with the practical benefits each side stands to gain, has breathed new life into the diplomatic process. As expert-level negotiations begin to take shape, the world may once again witness how adversaries, driven by necessity and self-interest, can find common ground – even amid deep mistrust.

Courtesy: alarabiya