Yasar Yakis
According to the terms of the ceasefire agreement brokered in November 2020 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Lachin Corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh had to be transferred to Azerbaijan in August 2022. The corridor links Armenia to Azerbaijan’s autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Article 6 of the ceasefire agreement provided that Armenia would return the Lachin District of Azerbaijan by Dec. 1, 2020. It was also agreed that, within the next three years – from December 2020 to December 2023 – a plan would be outlined for the construction of a new route to connect Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia that would avoid the Azerbaijani district of Lachin. Stepanakert, the capital of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh, has yet to fulfill this promise. Furthermore, the Republic of Azerbaijan was to guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving in both directions along the Lachin Corridor.
A two-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia resurged in September last year. A precarious atmosphere continues to prevail. This short conflagration caused a total of 280 deaths across the two sides. Azerbaijan acknowledged 80 fatalities among its troops and the Armenian prime minister admitted the death of 280 combatants. Azerbaijan claimed that Armenian forces had staged “large-scale subversive acts,” using “saboteurs” who planted landmines. Journalists, politicians and political analysts have scrutinized these allegations and considered them to be unfounded or unverifiable. On July 11 this year, Baku complained that unauthorized goods were being smuggled into Nagorno-Karabakh in the vehicles of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Last year’s fighting ended with Azerbaijani troops taking control of strategic positions deep inside Armenia, with at least 7,600 civilians displaced from Armenian provinces. A ceasefire was again brokered between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia, which has always been the game-maker in Azeri-Armenian conflicts, could not play the role of mediator in the implementation of this ceasefire because it was too busy with the Ukrainian crisis.
There are too many international actors that want to get involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. The EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the former Soviet Union’s version of NATO – are among them. Some of them are self-appointed. Karabakh Armenians want to involve as many parties as possible in this already complicated issue, while Azerbaijan regards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as a domestic question. Despite the several advantages that Azerbaijan holds in the present truce between Baku and Yerevan, it has not diverged from any of the conditions of the agreement brokered in November 2020. Armenia occupied Nagorno-Karabakh for 40 years and the OSCE’s Minsk Group did nothing to liberate the Azerbaijani enclave from the Armenian occupation. Azerbaijan does not want to face a situation of frozen conflict for another 30 years, as it did in Nagorno-Karabakh between 1990 and 2020. If a new conflagration erupts, there is only a slim chance that the Karabakh Armenians will gain more territory. The process of normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia has to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion before it returns to being a frozen conflict. The Ukrainian crisis may push the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis to the second row, but both Azerbaijan and Armenia have the advantage to solve it at once.
The CSTO, NATO’s counterpart in the post-Soviet geography, could play a mediating role in Nagorno-Karabakh, but neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia trust this organization. Baku will not use the advantageous position that it holds at present in order to settle for good in the Armenian territories it controls. It will probably use this position of strength in order to persuade Armenia to come to a fair solution.
All interested countries seem to be mobilized to seek a solution that would satisfy Armenia’s maximalist aspirations. Another question is whether the EU should deploy monitors in a conflict in which a CSTO country – Armenia – is involved. Furthermore, Armenia is not ready to accept a peacekeeping mission composed of Russian soldiers. So, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has to be handled with the utmost care. Almost all contacts by Western organizations regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue are conducted through Armenian channels, while the conflict zone is part of an autonomous Azerbaijani territory and nobody contests this, which is ironic. The most reasonable solution would be for Azerbaijan and Armenia to get together and solve their problems without the involvement of third parties, because these third parties each have their own interests.
The Armenian population has difficulties in admitting that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory that enjoys many rights except sovereignty. Diaspora Armenians, mainland Armenians, the EU and countries like France mislead the Karabakh Armenians into asking for more rights than they are entitled to under international law. Azerbaijan is an oil-rich country. It is planning to send oil to European countries to make up for the shortfall created by Russia’s withdrawal from the European oil market. Armenians are skilled people. Therefore, if peace prevails in Azerbaijan, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh may contribute to Azerbaijan’s economy. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan are leaders who are determined to persuade their respective electorates to live together in peace and draw benefits from the immense oil revenues of Azerbaijan.
