Anna Ohanyan
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia and Europe were unable to establish cooperation in the field of security. The Kremlin has sought to conclude large-scale deals in the hope of cementing the post-Soviet space in its sphere of influence. In turn, Europe prioritized the principles of a market economy and liberal democracy, and therefore, in matters of ensuring order and security in the post-Soviet space, it adhered to a completely different approach, which was based on rights and rules.
This contradiction manifested itself whenever an-other military conflict fl-ared up in the post-Soviet space. In the absence of a comprehensive security agreement with Europe, Russia relied on creating “controlled chaos”: engaging in conflicts that erupted along its borders, it sought to stabilize them, but did not offer a final solution, retaining the ability to influence these regional hot spots. However, the recent 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which flared up with the connivance of Mo-scow, revealed the limitati-ons of both the Russian and European approaches to en-suring security in the post-Soviet space and showed that Russia is unable to fully control local players.
After numerous attempts to achieve a ceasefire in Karabakh, the Kremlin negotiated an agreement that consolidated the gains achieved by Azerbaijan with Turkey’s support on the battlefield. The Armenians had to make heavy concessions, and not European or Turkish, but Russian peacekeepers were brought into the conflict zone. Analysts will debate for a long time whether the Kremlin suffered political losses in the last Karabakh war, or whether it laid the foundations for a new regional order, within which Ankara and Moscow shared the main roles. However, it is already obvious that Russia, which has long resisted the intervention of external forces in the Transcaucasus, will now face the expansion of Turkish influence in the region.
The war has demonstrated that geopolitically Russia should not be viewed as either a criminal or a victim – this approach does not allow us to understand the full complexity of wars in the post-Soviet space and does not take into account local factors affecting their course. It doesn’t matter now whether Russia and Europe conclude a big geopolitical deal – any sustainable security architecture in the Transcaucasus will be deeply local in nature and depend on inclusive institutions that will emerge only when the countries of the region undergo political liberalization.
As history shows, it was possible to resolve regional conflicts when the efforts of the great powers were combined with the formation of liberal political systems – both of these factors create a favorable environment for resolving conflicts and subsequent integration. In the short term, the Rus-sian-mediated ceasefire agreement in Karabakh can ensure geopolitical stability and create conditions under which European regional institutions will begin to influence the development trajectory of the Transcau-casian countries. Europe’s commitment to a liberal, r-ules-based political order can ensure lasting peace in the region and help with m-uch-needed reforms to states that have a stake in them.
Russia as a peacemaker: In political terms, the European powers were excluded from the ceasefire agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh and therefore, most likely, will react to the hastily concluded “Russian peace” cool and wary. Compared to previous cases where Russia had to intervene in regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space, this time it seems to have gotten deeper than usual. In this regard, the question arises: will Moscow be able to be an honest mediator in the search for a final political solution to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict?
Such a decision should once and for all determine the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The current agreement put an end to hostilities, consolidated the military successes of Azerbaijan and obliged the opposing sides to exchange prisoners of war and open transport corridors. Nevertheless, it bypassed the main issue – the political status of Karabakh. Apparently, Moscow does not intend to rush into this yet .
If the status issue remains in limbo, it will increase the fears of the region’s ethnic Armenians for their safety. At the same time, the current uncertain situation serves as the main political justification for the presence of Russian peacekeepers there.
However, the Kremlin’s relative control over the situation in the region can provide a level of stability in which Europe is able to turn the current agreements into the basis for multilateral cooperation. Russia faces an ambitious task of securing peace and creating a solid foundation for the future development of the region, and the influence of Europe, with its norms based on the principles of law and good governance, can play an important role in the process of peaceful construction.
The situation after the Karabakh war also gives the Kremlin an opportunity to influence the internal politics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thanks to the deployment of peacekeepers, Russia secured a military presence in Azerbaijan for the first time since 2012, when the Gabala radar station , built during the Cold War , was closed . According to a number of observers, by signing the agreement proposed by Russia, Azerbaijan won not so much a victory as concluded a Faustian deal : in exchange for returning the previously occupied territories, Baku will have to come to terms with the restrictions that the Russian presence will impose on its foreign policy and security doctrines.
Nevertheless, over the years of his rule, Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly proved that he is able to achieve what he wants from major powers. Using “energy diplomacy” , that is, the supply of gas and oil to Europe, Azerbaijan has successfully ignored Western calls for reforms and liberalization for many years. Now , having secured the patronage of Turkey, Aliyev is successfully confronting critics inside the country, however, very few, who are protesting against the introduction of Russian troops into the territory of Azerbaijan. Playing on the contradictions between Russia and the West, then between Russia and Turkey, Aliyev adheres to a typical strategy of survival, inherent in many post-Soviet regimes that find themselves in the same precarious position between the major powers.
In Armenia, Russia received much more serious instruments of influence on the young democracy . The close cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey during the war made many Armenians, both in Karabakh and in Armenia itself, acutely feel their vulnerability, and the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone seems to only strengthen the predominantly pro-Moscow orientation of the country’s political forces.
The popular anger aga-inst Nikol Pashinyan, caus-ed by military defeats, raises the question of the sustainability of the democratic gains of the 2018 Velvet Revolution . Amid growing tensions, Armenian politicians again started talking about possible concessions that democracy should make for the sake of security (or stability), and this threatens the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in the country.
What Europe can do: If Europe supports the “Russian peace” in Karabakh, it can play a role in the restoration of the region and contribute to its sustainable development in the future. An important positive consequence of this will be the advancement of democracy in Transcaucasia, which, paradoxically, will be greatly facilitated by the world imposed by Russia.
The expansion of commercial ties , which is highly likely given Moscow’s interest in unblocking transport and trade routes in the region , will bring economic dividends to the weakened Armenian democracy, and subsequently, perhaps, reduce the sense of an impending threat in Yerevan and allow the country to look confidently into the future.
Strengthening democracy in Armenia will be extremely good news for neighboring Georgia, where reforms have stalled in recent years. As history shows, democracies strive for regional consolidation , supporting each other in the face of authoritarian neighbors.
The unification of democratic forces in Georgia and Armenia, sandwiched between authoritarian Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia, may well contribute to their mutual strengthening. It is possible that the consistent participation of Europe in the political and economic processes in Transcaucasia under the protection of the Russian peacekeeping operation will push the process of democratic consolidation in the region, which, in turn, will serve as an example for neighboring countries.
It will be easier to build a regional security architecture in the neighborhood of Europe if the process goes from the bottom up. This implies targeted and meaningful support for democratic politicians and nudging authoritarian states towards more accountable and responsible governance. Until now, both in Transcaucasia and in other regions, Europe has been extremely inconsistent in upholding these principles.
Unresolved conflicts such as the one in Karabakh remain the forefront of authoritarian consolidation, threatening to undermine democratic gains. They help to strengthen the power of authoritarian leaders who use such conflicts to silence internal opposition.
Finally, while Europe’s support for the reconciliation, reconstruction and reform process can help stabilize the South Caucasus, it must be provided on the basis of respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. In the 1990s, when Europe unconditionally supported the sovereignty of the new post-Soviet states, attention was paid to these issues only in words.
Since the time that Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan gained independence, the protection of minority rights has become a political issue throughout the Transcaucasia, which has created conditions for the emergence of illiberal regimes opposed to political reform. The European capitals must admit this failure. Participation in the affairs of the region must be built on the uncompromising and determined upholding of human rights and the protection of minorities. Otherwise, Europe’s intentions to establish a lasting peace in Transcaucasia will not be crowned with success.
