Kerry Boyd Anderson
There are many lenses that analysts of US politics use to try to understand the country’s political and cultural divisions: rural versus urban, “blue” versus “red” states, coastal versus interior, wealth disparities, racial and religious identities, and so forth. These frameworks offer useful insights into American politics and society, but they also miss important elements of subcultures that are not confined by city or state borders.
Colin Woodard’s “American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America” offers an additional lens. Originally published in 2011, an updated version was recently released, and Woodard wrote a follow-up book titled “American Character.” He also runs the Nationhood Lab. Woodard argues that Americans have experienced deep divisions dating back to the country’s colonial history. Today, the US primarily consists of 11 “nations,” or subcultures, which spread beyond the borders of states, he says. Woodard argues that today’s subcultures stem directly from the country’s settlement patterns, as early immigrants came to North America with their own values and ways of life, which followed them as they moved across new territory.
He identifies the early nations as Yankeedom (today’s northeast and upper Midwest), New Netherland (New York City), Tidewater (parts of eastern Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina), Midlands (spreading from parts of the East to the Midwest), Greater Appalachia (ranging from western Virginia to northern Texas), the Deep South, and El Norte (southwest). The Left Coast and the Far West came later. New France includes a small area in southern Louisiana, while New France and the First Nation have greater representation in Canada. The early settlers of these groups came to the New World with different goals. For example, the founders of Yankeedom sought to create a religious utopia, while the founders of New Netherland built a center for trade. The founders of Tidewater desired to recreate English country society with themselves positioned as gentry, while the Deep South leaders transplanted Caribbean-style slave society to the southern colonies. The early subcultures were informed by European cultural differences, reflecting English, Dutch, German, Scottish, Irish, French, Spanish and other backgrounds.
With such different worldviews, the various subcultures had conflicting ideas about religion, the role of government, community versus individual rights and responsibilities, hierarchy versus equality and much more. Some subcultures were pluralistic and relatively tolerant, particularly the Midlands and New Netherland. Others were intolerant, such as Yankeedom, which insisted on the righteousness of its religious views and efforts to reform society, and the Deep South, which insisted on strict class and racial hierarchies designed to serve elites. With time, these subcultures shifted and adapted to new territories and realities but maintained their core principles. Yankeedom evolved from devotion to religious puritanism to secular ideology. The Far West culture reflects a specific pattern of corporate- and government-led settlement. Tidewater slipped from one of the most powerful early nations to losing much of its influence to the Midlands, Greater Appalachia and the Deep South.
Woodard argues that much of US history has been defined by an ongoing battle for supremacy between Yankeedom and the Deep South. These two subcultures insist on the right to impose their values and social ideals on others. Much of the far left and far right in American politics today draw from Yankeedom and the Deep South. Yankeedom and the Deep South lack sufficient strength to dominate the other, so they form alliances with other nations, according to Woodard. Yankeedom has a solid alliance with the Left Coast and, more recently, with New Netherland. Greater Appalachia has shifted alliances over time but today is closely aligned with the Deep South. This leaves the Midlands, the Far West and El Norte caught in the middle, with the main two alliances competing for their votes but not truly dedicated to their values.
Woodard’s analysis offers crucial insights into American history and modern politics. His focus on cultural nations rather than states is a major contribution that reflects the lived reality of many Americans. For example, people living in the state of Illinois have very different political voting records and cultural norms based on whether they live in Chicago or central or southern parts of the state. In the states of Washington and Oregon, the mountains are a much more useful boundary for explaining political and cultural views than state borders. The construct of American nations also helps to explain why polarization is so entrenched. Americans often like to believe that their country once was united behind common values, but Woodard disproves that assumption. In reality, the country has long been locked in a battle between Yankeedom leaders who want to reform the country in ways that they believe are best and Deep South leaders who believe in hierarchical structures. These beliefs are fundamentally contradictory. As both sides seek to impose their views, compromise is difficult.
Other subcultures provide some balance. The Republican Party today is dominated by the alliance of the Deep South and Greater Appalachia. The latter has different values than the Deep South, particularly opposing the dominance of wealthy, upper-class elites. Yankeedom forms the most “progressive” element of the Democratic Party, but the Left Coast has somewhat different priorities and the Democratic coalition must also appeal to more live-and-let-live cultures such as the Midlands and New Netherland. Woodard’s book has some weaknesses. For example, his analysis does not offer much insight into African Americans’ influence in modern US politics or the role of Asian immigrants. However, overall, his approach offers a crucial lens to understanding US politics and culture.
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