Sinem Cengiz
The Russia-led Turkiye-Syria normalization process stands as the most critical diplomatic initiative in the Middle East after the Chinese-brokered Saudi Arabia-Iran normalization attempt. Although Damascus has engaged in efforts to normalize its relations with several Arab countries, Turkiye is a tough nut to crack as the path to rapprochement is full of mines for both sides.
The Turkish-Syrian engagement started last year thanks to Russian mediation. Following several intelligence-level contacts between the two countries, the first high-ranking engagement between Ankara and Damascus took place in December, when the Turkish, Russian and Syrian defense ministers met.
This normalization process took center stage a few weeks before the critical Turkish elections held in May. After a second meeting between the defense ministers — this time Iran was also included — in April, the first official meeting at the diplomatic level took place in May. For the first time since 2011, the Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers met in a summit that was held in Moscow to create a roadmap for Turkish-Syrian normalization.
During those two months, there was also strong pressure from Moscow to hold a meeting at the presidential level; however, the conditions on the ground were not ready for such negotiations at the table. This pushed Moscow to return to the defense-intelligence channel between the two countries, as it was crystal clear there were serious points of divergence between Ankara and Damascus related to the Turkish military presence in Syria, the fight against terrorism and the return of refugees.
Amid the slow pace of the Russian-initiated Turkish-Syrian rapprochement process, Damascus has recently escalated its harsh rhetoric toward Ankara, putting the process into a state of limbo. Syrian President Bashar Assad made it clear in an interview last week that the Turkiye-Syria normalization process had lost the momentum it gained before the May elections. Assad also rejected any meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, arguing that he aims to use the normalization talks to legitimize the Turkish presence in Syria.
Ankara immediately — using the same tone — responded to Assad’s remarks, refusing any Turkish military withdrawal from the northern part of the war-torn country before securing its own national security.
In the meantime, the Syrian foreign minister, who recently attended a meeting in Cairo, reportedly asked for the support of the Arab countries against Turkiye. However, as Ankara has mended its relations with the Arab states, Syria’s request is unlikely to receive any positive responses. Moreover, having some tangible outcomes from the Turkish-Syrian normalization process is what the region’s countries seek, rather than any escalations between the two neighbors.
The harsh rhetoric from the Syrian side is not only an indication of Damascus’ reluctance to mend ties with Ankara, but is also a sign of weakening Russian influence on Assad. In addition, the gradual acceptance of the Assad regime’s return to the Arab fold has given it the confidence to not make any concessions in the talks with Ankara, but rather drag its feet until the conditions turn in its favor. Damascus’ messages not only show a lack of trust in the process, but also that it aims to turn the process into a bargain, in which it hopes for the upper hand.
To proceed along the path of normalization, there are several variables that shape Turkiye and Syria’s motivations, which are both economic and political/security-based.
The driving force behind Ankara’s approach is the aim to find tangible relief from the refugee burden. The repatriation of Syrian refugees was one of the pledges made by the Turkish leadership after the election victory. The solution for this issue is closely tied to the normalization process between Ankara and Damascus, but also the support of the regional states. In the past few weeks, Turkiye has increased the number of deportations, but there is still no concrete plan.
A second pressing issue for Turkiye is the Kurdish terrorism threat emanating from the northern part of Syria. This issue was the driving force behind Ankara’s deviation from its initial policy of seeking a change in the Syrian leadership. Turkiye’s current concern is that, if it withdraws from the areas it secured from the terrorist elements, Kurdish militias might take control again, posing a serious security threat to the Turkish state. Ankara wants an effective and specific mechanism to combat terrorism and this is only possible when its concerns are addressed by the Syrian regime, as well as by the US and Russia.
The US military last week deployed more reinforcements to its bases in northern Syria, in areas currently occupied by the Kurdish People’s Defense Units, which is considered a terrorist group by Ankara but which Washington describes as “partner forces.” Within this context, Ankara refuses to withdraw its troops because neither Washington nor Damascus are addressing its security concerns.
The third pressing issue for Ankara is to maintain the delicate relationship it has with Moscow, which is the key actor in settling on a draft roadmap for Turkiye and Syria. Given the closeness in Turkish-Russian ties and Russia’s influence over the Syrian regime, it was presumed that the course of the Turkiye-Syria detente would run in parallel to the rapid normalization efforts between Syria and the Arab states. However, this long-touted rapprochement has several variables and actors that put the interests of the two sides into conflict.
The rapprochement path is not a bed of roses but rather a minefield, and the status quo is fragile. So, despite Russian pressure and in light of the conditions set by each side, the Turkish-Syrian normalization is unlikely to proceed at a rapid pace, at least at the political level, although the security level is expected to continue.
