Sinem Cengiz
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intense three-day Gulf tour was remarkable both symbolically and strategically, reflecting Ankara’s projection of its relations with the states of the region in the coming years. Erdogan’s visits to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were aimed at cementing the rapid normalization process following the years of tension in Turkiye’s relations with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, while the visit to Qatar aspired to boost the two countries’ already enlarged cooperation.
It was Erdogan’s first official visit to the region since his reelection as president in May and he brought with him a large entourage including both political and business figures. It also confirmed that the formula founded by Turkiye and the Gulf countries for sustainable relations based on mutual economic and security interests was not going to remain in the realm of rhetoric. However, what political results could this tour yield for Turkish-Gulf relations? What is the basis of the new partnerships that Ankara aims to develop with the Gulf countries?
Before delving into this, it is worth mentioning some key notes from Erdogan’s visit to each Gulf state, toward which Ankara pursues a different approach based on diverging agendas. During his three-nation trip, the Turkish president gifted each Gulf leader with a domestically produced electric car made by Togg, which is evolving to be another angle for Turkish soft power. The images of Erdogan and the Gulf leaders taking a car ride together without their entourage and security offered a clear indication of how world leaders have started to use different modes of diplomacy to show the personal closeness between them.
The Turkish president’s first stop was Saudi Arabia, where the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement that is said to be “the biggest defense and aviation export contract in Turkiye’s history.” The nature of Turkiye’s defense cooperation is such that Gulf countries orient their defense relations on the basis of their respective national interests and regional strategies. On the other side, the growing Gulf interest in the Turkish defense industry is a boost for Ankara, which is trying to increase exports to help ease its economic problems. This equation forms the defense-economy nexus in Turkiye-Gulf relations.
Besides the five agreements inked on investment, the defense industry, energy and media cooperation, both the Saudi and Turkish leaders touched upon Iran and stressed the importance of Tehran’s commitment to a peaceful nuclear program, among other things. Being two heavyweights in the region, Ankara and Riyadh’s vision on regional issues have both aligned and clashed over the past decade; however, there are some dossiers, such as Syria and Iraq, that necessitate tangible cooperation between the two countries despite some areas of competition. In this regard, Turkish-Saudi relations can be described as manageable competition that is based on a realistic and pragmatic approach.
The second leg of the Gulf tour was to Qatar, a visit which was mostly a symbolic one that celebrated the 50-year anniversary of Turkish-Qatari diplomatic relations. Although Ankara’s relationship with Doha has strong economic motivations, it could be better described as a marriage of convenience based on ideological and political motivations.
The third stopover in the Gulf tour was to the UAE, where Erdogan was awarded the Order of Zayed, which is considered the highest civilian honor granted by the Emirates. Turkiye and the UAE signed and ratified 13 agreements in various fields worth $50.7 billion. Ankara and Abu Dhabi also agreed to establish a high-level strategic council, elevating the level of their relations to a strategic partnership. From former foes to today’s strategic partners, the Turkish-Emirati relationship can be described as a middle of the road one based on economic gains, while political issues are off the agenda for the moment.
The focus now turns to seeing when and how the agreements signed during these visits can be turned into sustainable and deepened economic cooperation. The rapprochement efforts between Turkiye and the Gulf countries were initially based on economic targets, with political issues put aside. However, sustained economic and security cooperation between Turkiye and the Gulf states will certainly have political outcomes in the region in the long term.
Ankara’s bilateral ties with each Gulf state have their own dynamics. There are still political disagreements between Turkiye and some Gulf states that the parties have decided to turn into an “agree to disagree” understanding to avoid deadlocks. Neither the Gulf states nor Turkiye are keen to take aggressive foreign policy approaches at the expense of their newly repaired ties. For both Turkiye and the young leaderships in the Gulf states, a long-term strategic partnership offers strategic benefits.
In particular, Turkiye’s five-year investment plans are an attractive strategy for the Gulf leaderships that seek critical investments and projects in accordance with their ambitious national visions and economic diversification agendas. The Gulf countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, are going through an important transformation process. Turkiye’s cooperation in economic and security means over the next five years can raise the level of relations to a strategic point.
While the major issues that led to the tensions in Turkish-Gulf relations are not present anymore or have been partially resolved, the two sides still share concerns about instability in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Iraq. Turkiye needs cooperation with the Gulf states on these specific regional dossiers.
Long-term economic agreements between Turkiye and the Gulf states may pave the way for closer regional cooperation based on their shared political interests. The key question is how, with which Gulf states and on which dossiers this cooperation will kick off.
