Tom Sharpe
Between 7 October and yesterday, the Iranian-backed Houthis have fired over 70 missiles and drones into the Red Sea. Early shots, fired on 26 October, were aimed at Israel itself and intercepted by USS Carney. Within a few weeks, they were firing at “ships connected with Israel”. In what was a well-orchestrated crescendo, this then broadened again to ‘ships going to and from Israel’.
By now the USS Mason, Thomas Hudner, HMS Diamond and French Ship Languedoc had joined Carney in achieving surface-to-air “kills”. Two successful hijackings occurred as well. The US Navy has shot down two missiles heading towards a container ship in the southern Red Sea. This has delivered the Houthi end state – disrupting freedom of navigation in an international chokepoint through which twelve per cent of global trade passes.
All the while the nation with the lead for keeping sea lanes open, whether they like it or not, has been on an entirely defensive footing. Early on, US announcements were at pains to emphasise that nothing had been fired at them when, given the geography of the Red Sea, it would have been equally easy to claim this the other way. The White House decided early that “disciplined restraint” was to be the policy in the Red Sea. In early December the Houthis escalated further, with their targeting becoming largely random. No one was safe: ships were hit and catching fire, including the Hong-Kong-flagged Maersk Gibraltar. The backlog of shipping companies unwilling to run the gauntlet increased rapidly with major carriers such as MSC, Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd and BP deeming the risk too high, either re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope or pausing whilst looking for increased US assurance.
To an extent this came on 18 December, when US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) and invitations to 20 or so countries were sent. On Boxing Day the USS Laboon, another Arleigh-Burke destroyer, joined the fight. It shot down twelve drones, two land attack cruise missiles and, most impressively, two anti-ship ballistic missiles. This doesn’t mean that OPG isn’t working. Coalitions of this complexity take time to settle, but there are flaws that need to be addressed if restoring freedom of navigation – its end goal – is to be achieved.
First, the US hasn’t gone to sufficient lengths to delineate between support for this freedom of navigation task and their support for Israel in Gaza. Their point of origin is, of course, the same, but the task has diverged. This is not clear enough yet, at least not to France, Spain and Italy who are currently saying, “we’ll support this task, but not under them”. Second, OPG remains entirely defensive. You don’t need to be an Air Warfare Officer to realise that this is both unsustainable and risky. They have more $20,000 drones than we have $2 million dollar missiles. Besides, playing defence and nothing else eventually sees the opposition score.
The net result is that OPG has got off to a rocky start. Yesterday it was reported that 299 vessels with the capacity to carry 4.3 million containers have either changed course or plan to – double the number from a week ago. So what is the UK doing about this brewing maritime situation? The answer is “quite a lot”. Britain has two warships there, more than anyone deployed except the US and the Chinese. HMS Diamond, a Type 45 destroyer was sent there specifically for this task. HMS Lancaster, a Type 23 Frigate has left her forward base in The Gulf and come round to the Gulf of Aden to support.
But it’s broader than just the ships. UK defence is well positioned to assist across a wide range of activities. Bases in Cyprus, Duqm, Bahrain and Diego Garcia all form part of the well-founded UK logistics and alliance networks that are essential to sustaining operations at this sort of range. Cyprus in particular gives a range of options albeit more in the Eastern Med rather than the Red Sea. There is a part of our tool kit currently alongside in Portsmouth Harbour that should be dispatched now – the HMS Queen Elizabeth.
She’s vulnerable, but not infinitely vulnerable as some would believe, especially not there – and without diving into the tactics behind layered defence, there are plenty of ships out there who could protect her, just as they are protecting the USS Dwight D Eisenhower in the Gulf of Aden right now. Her aircraft have now chalked up some air-to-air kills which all help in the sustainability battle.
Aircraft carriers are a strategic asset whose value lies beyond numbers of jets and bombs. The USS Ford in the Eastern Mediterranean is a live case study in the deterrent effect of a carrier. They are a mobile embassy, allied HQ and airfield all in one. It just so happens that they can conduct offensive operations when asked to, but this should not lead the conversation around their utility. The HMS Queen Elizabeth is not the complete package in terms of numbers of jets, solid support (ammunition and spares) and airborne early warning. Decades of defence parsimony has assured this. The narrative that this is acceptable because she is a 50-year project is for another time. The one that says “she doesn’t need all these things because she is designed to operate as part of a coalition” also makes me uncomfortable.
Retention is a key RN issue, but providing she is sent to the right place to do her job, this would not be a problem. Global deployments without going ashore or loitering in the Eastern Mediterranean hoping to be tasked, as the Littoral Response Group have been doing since 7 October, cause people to leave. Sending them up threat on core tasking does not. The US Navy is stretched thin and the USS Ford on her maiden deployment has been extended twice.
The USS Dwight D Eisenhower was deployed early – how long will she be expected to stay on task? What happens if she breaks down, or when she has to go into port for maintenance? Conversations with the US about trust and posture towards Israel should take place behind closed doors. In the meantime, Britain should be overtly assisting them to reassure shipping companies that the Red Sea is safe again.
There is a book to be written on international chokepoints, their connectivity, their effect on global trade and now any country that depends on them should invest in navies to protect them. The Houthis should probably write the foreword: this trend could escalate fast next year. Elements of the British government led by the FCDO aren’t clear on how to use our carriers just now. That the Foreign Secretary was responsible for the early demise of the entire capability in 2011, weeks before it was needed off Libya, might be part of this.
There is a feeling that deploying is in itself escalatory rather than a sensible precaution in response to an international maritime crisis. And if you are a military planner, or a budget holder, constantly trying to ring out every last drop of cash, you could fall into this same hole. Compare this mindset to the US, who had the USS Ford extended and the Ike out of the door within days of 7 October, even before the Houthis started lighting up the Red Sea. Get them there early where they can deter, shape, influence, deescalate and only if necessary strike. HMS QE can’t do any of these things from Pompey harbour. Meanwhile, uncertainty in the Red Sea prevails and prices in your house will go up as a result. This is not an ‘out of sight’ problem and for now, OPG is not solving it. To do so, it must distance itself from events in Gaza to garner the international support it needs to be sustainable. It also needs a non-escalatory strike element that removes Houthi munitions, degrades their will to fight and sends a clear message to anyone else wanting to jump in that we still have teeth.
In UK defence terms, now is not the time to be worrying about beautifully crafted long-term plans and short-term resource bills. Get the ship and her network out of the door now. This is a perfect task to demonstrate to those who paid for it the huge utility of the carrier. If not, then why have it? History almost universally shows that failing to act decisively, no matter how delicate the situation, ends up costing more anyway.
