Talmiz Ahmad
The Iraq-based Kata’ib Hezbollah, a major part of the Iran-sponsored Popular Mobilization Units, in January directed a drone strike at America’s Tower 22 base in Jordan. Three American servicemen, believing that the drone was “friendly,” took no evasive action and were killed. These were the first deaths of US soldiers at the hands of Iraqi militants, who have been directing missile and drone attacks on US targets in Iraq and Syria in response to Israel’s assaults on Palestinians in Gaza since Oct. 7.
The US responded with airstrikes on Feb. 2 and a drone strike in eastern Baghdad on Feb. 7 that killed a Kata’ib Hezbollah commander, Abu Baqir Al-Saadi. This led to a chorus of condemnation in Iraq. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani described the first US attack as “an act of aggression against Iraq’s sovereignty.” Iraqi military spokesman Maj. Gen. Yehia Rasool said the second strike further motivated the Iraqi government to seek an end to the US presence in the country. Rasool ominously noted that the US attack “threatens to entangle Iraq in the cycle of conflict,” referring to the likelihood of the Gaza war pulling Iraq into a regionwide conflagration.
Iraqi officials and militants have been actively supporting their brethren in Gaza since October. Al-Sudani and all previous Iraqi prime ministers have expressed solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza and condemned “Israeli provocations and violations.” The various militias in the country have backed the Palestinians by directing attacks at US targets.
By mid-December, there had been nearly 100 attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria, as well as an attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad. American retaliatory strikes have killed several militants and, occasionally, militia commanders. To prevent these attacks from getting out of hand, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Baghdad in early November to urge the Iraqi government to control the militants more effectively and to convey to Iran that the ongoing tit-for-tat strikes could escalate into a wider conflict.
Al-Sudani carried this message to Tehran the next day, when he met Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. Observers believe he emphasized to his Iranian interlocutors that Iraq did not wish to get embroiled in a regional conflict. Later in November, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein urged the US to put pressure on Israel to stop the war, warning that the Gaza conflict could “burn all of us.”
Iraq has a long history of supporting Palestinian aspirations. Its troops participated in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel. In 2022, Iraq passed the anti-normalization law that penalized any contacts with Israel. This was perhaps aimed at preempting attempts from Iraqi officials to normalize ties with Israel. And in October 2023, dissident cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr mobilized about half a million of his supporters for pro-Palestine rallies in Baghdad.
The Gaza war has not only led to an increase in attacks on US targets in the region by Iraqi militants; there has also been increasing disenchantment with America among members of the country’s civil society. They have been agitating for a reformed democratic order since 2019, when their demonstrations were brutally put down by security forces. Now, witnessing the impunity with which Israel has wreaked murder and mayhem in Gaza, few Iraqis believe that the US will promote civil rights and democracy in their country.
In fact, the December provincial elections affirmed the resilience of Iraq’s sectarian and family-based political order. The ruling Coordination Framework, the coalition of pro-Iran parties that opposes Al-Sadr, won most of the Shiite-majority provinces in central and southern Iraq and made major gains in areas hitherto under Sadrist or Kurdish influence. The latter include the provinces of Kirkuk, long-coveted by the Kurds, and Nineveh, which includes 16 “disputed administrative units” claimed by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Popular dissatisfaction with the US, the electoral gains of the ruling political coalition and strong pro-Palestine sentiment in the country have together encouraged fresh calls for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. In January, an agreement was made between Iraq and the US to start discussions on the future presence of American troops, reflecting, according to US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, “the deep US commitment to regional stability and Iraqi sovereignty.” Both Al-Sudani and the Iraqi Foreign Ministry have said that these discussions will lead to a timeline for an end to the US-led anti-Daesh coalition’s presence in Iraq. In February, 100 members of the Iraqi parliament signed a petition seeking an emergency session to discuss the expulsion of all US and other foreign troops.
However, this will be easier said than done. The US has just 2,500 troops in Iraq and another 900 in Syria. Their presence has less to do with stopping the revival of Daesh forces than with balancing Iranian military and political influence in the two countries. However, by early March, the number of attacks on US targets had exceeded 180, indicating that Gaza could ignite conflict in Iraq, ahead of Lebanon or Yemen.
Given the sordid record of America’s military misadventures in Iraq and the persisting dislike of US forces, both Baghdad and Washington would greatly benefit from US troops’ withdrawal from Iraq.
