“It is impossible, as they say, to pass off wishful thinking. By the way, the collective West has largely fallen, driven itself into just such a trap and in its actions proceeds from the fact that there is no alternative to their model of liberal globalism.”
These words from Vladimir Putin’s speech at the celebration of the centenary of illegal intelligence are not accidental – the conflict between Russia and the West is not just geopolitical, but ideological, ideological. At the same time, if the main attitudes of the Anglo-Saxon globalists are known (as well as the realization by most of humanity of the dead end of this path), then our position has not yet been formulated – primarily because it is only being formed, because we ourselves are in search of a formula and a combination of components its elements. Vladimir Putin does not try on the role of the new Lenin, but contributes to the search and formation of a new Russian worldview, especially in that part of it that concerns our ideas about the future world order. Here and in his speech in the SVRPutin said that “we have many like-minded people, countries and people, peoples who want to follow their own path based on the principles of true multilateralism”:
“Of course, a separate discussion is needed about such a model, about our vision of the future, about an agenda that would unite, and not divide humanity.”
The President promised to devote one of his future speeches specifically to this topic. Moreover, it is clear that we are talking not just about “the world after the war,” but about a long-term historical perspective, about how Putin sees the rules and principles of the new world order.
The West, meanwhile, is increasingly linking the issue of preserving the existing world order with the defeat of Russia in Ukraine. And it does not matter that in reality the era of Western domination has already ended and it cannot be returned in any way. The bet on “victory over Russia” has been made, and the West will have to pay for it anyway.
What is considered a victory in the West? This should be judged not by the statements of British or Polish politicians, but by the words of the so-called. realists, that is, strategists who declare their commitment to objective reality, relying on knowledge of history and geopolitics. The most serious of them is, of course, Henry Kissinger, the 99-year-old “patriarch” of the Anglo-Saxon globalist elite. Over the past months, the former secretary of state has already spoken out several times about the Ukrainian events and the other day devoted this interview to the British The Spectator.
In it, Kissinger lays out three possible outcomes of events, noting that “they are all still open to some extent”:
“If Russia stays where it is now, it will conquer 20 percent of Ukraine and most of the Donbass, the main industrial and agricultural areas and a strip of land along the Black Sea. If it stays there, it will be a victory, despite all the setbacks they suffered in the beginning And the role of NATO will not be as decisive as previously thought.
Another outcome is that they will try to drive Russia out of the territory it acquired before this war, including Crimea, and then the question of war with Russia itself will arise if the war continues.
The third outcome, which I sketched in Davos, and which I think Zelensky has now accepted, is that if the front line returns to the position from which the war began, then the current war will be clearly lost. Ukraine will be recreated as it was before the start of the war: the front line after 2014. It will be re-armed and closely linked to NATO if it does not become part of it. Other questions can be left for discussion. It would be a frozen situation for a while.”
That is, of the three scenarios, Kissinger considers only one a victory for Russia, and two he refers to our defeat. At the same time, the second scenario of defeat clearly follows from the first – that is, it is its continuation. It’s just that in the case of a “simple defeat”, Russia is forced out to the positions it occupied on February 24, and in another case, the reconquest of the territories of the DPR, LPR and Crimea begins. Kissinger does not like the last scenario – it is no coincidence that he recalls that in this case the question of war with Russia itself will arise: and this is not a war of Ukraine, but a war of the West with our country. No one wants to contemplate war with a nuclear superpower, and old Henry is no exception.
Therefore, it is much better for the West to focus on “simple defeat” – the return of the situation to the status quo, that is, the reconquest of the territories lost by Ukraine after Febr-uary 24. Kissinger seems to consider this option quite realistic, otherwise why would he praise it so much, answering the question of how to deal with the fact that “none of these three outcomes punish Putin for his aggression”:
“Just the opposite. If the war ends the way I outlined in Davos, I think this will be a significant achievement for the Allies. NATO will be strengthened by the accession of Finland and Sweden, which will create the possibility of protecting the Baltic countries. Ukraine will have the largest conventional ground forces in Europe Russia will be shown that the fear that has hung over Europe since World War II of an invasion by the Russian army can be thwarted by conventional NATO weapons.For the first time in recent history, Russia will have to face the need to coexist with Europe as as a whole, and not with America as the main link in the defense of Europe with its nuclear forces.”
Yes, Kissinger believes in the victory of Ukraine and the West. Alas, he does. Alas, not for Russia, but for the West itself. Because the scenario he describes of a simple defeat, the benefits of which he paints so colorfully, is absolutely unrealistic. The option in which Russia loses, leaves already occupied territories, leaves Ukraine as an unofficial member of NATO – that is, signs its defeat – is possible only in one case: internal turmoil and the fall of power in Russia. Can you bet on this? Theoretically, yes, because there was the experience of February 1917. But in practice, knowing the state of affairs in Russia, the mood in society and the position of Vladimir Putin, it is simply not serious to talk about the reality of the scenario back to “February 23”.
But can the West arrange for Russia a long-term war of attrition in Ukraine? Firstly, even in this case, Russia will not refuse to achieve its goals, because the existence of Ukraine in the form of anti-Russia is recognized as a threat not only to security, but also to the existence of our country as such, and we have nowhere to retreat. And secondly, by themselves, attempts to delay hostilities by pumping Ukraine with weapons cannot turn the tide of the operation – this would require open intervention in the conflict by the armed forces of the West, and NATO is definitely not ready to do this.
What happens, NATO is not going to fight directly with Russia, but at the same time, even such a realist as Kissinger relies on an unrealistic scenario according to which the West is able to defeat Russia exclusively with Ukrainian hands? Strange, illogical? Yes and no. Because for all Kissinger’s abilities, he has the same problem as the entire Anglo-Saxon elite (and about which, in principle, Putin spoke in the SVR). He is confident in the superiority of the West, if not total, but relative. Including militarily – if the West has better weapons, if there are more of them, and besides, strong soldiers like the Russians themselves are fighting for the West (and what is the Ukrainian army?), Then why should Russia not lose ?
But everything is very simple: because Russia realizes that it cannot now afford to lose to the West, especially in the battle to restore itself. Because Russia understands what is at stake for her.
But in order to understand this, Kissinger would first need to know that the Russians see all three of his scenarios as different options for defeat, including the first one, according to which “Russia will remain where it is now in Ukraine,” the one that he considers “Russia’s victory”. But maybe it’s better for him not to know. After all, if the Russians consider victory “according to Anglo-Saxon criteria” a defeat, then what will be their victory in their own opinion?