Sinem Cengiz
Over the past decade, as disagreements with the US over security in the Middle East, especially in Syria, have intensified, coupled with frustrations regarding its EU membership process and criticisms of the Western order, Turkiye has gradually leaned toward closer ties with non-Western powers, particularly Russia and China. Although Beijing does not have the same significance as Moscow in Turkish foreign policy, the Turkish government has recently been busy cultivating closer ties with its Chinese counterpart.
Last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made an official visit to China, where he spoke of his country’s pursuit of new opportunities for cooperation with different partners in platforms like BRICS. He added that he would attend the China-led BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Russia on June 10-11. His statement from Beijing received a positive response from Moscow, where a Kremlin spokesperson stated that Turkiye’s interest in the economic bloc would be on the agenda at next week’s summit.
BRICS is a bloc of emerging economies that is made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It recently admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE as full members. This is not the first time that Ankara has expressed a desire to formally join BRICS. Now, however, the timing is significant. Fidan’s visit and his statement came after China had raised its voice about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Beijing, which had previously kept a relatively low profile in relation to the conflict, unlike its major rival the US, last week called for a Middle East peace conference.
Fidan, who has been busy with a diplomatic blitz on Gaza in cooperation with counterparts from the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, said he would work with China for a ceasefire in Gaza. Fidan also said that, during his visit, he extended President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s invitation for Xi Jinping to visit Turkiye this year.
As a NATO member, Turkiye has come under fire from its Western allies in recent years over its ties with Russia and China. Ankara has rejected the claim that its “axis” is shifting away from the Western military alliance, saying that it remains a committed member of NATO and maintains its goal of full membership of the EU. However, the scale at which Turkiye is developing its relations with non-Western powers — in the political, economic and security dimensions — has been a concern for Western states, particularly since the outbreak of the Ukraine-Russia war.
This month, Turkiye reiterated its support for the continuation of aid to Ukraine and for its efforts to secure its sovereignty, but it warned that it would refuse to support any NATO involvement in the war against Russia. Russia had already become a significant player for Turkiye in the initial post-Cold War period. However, Turkiye was firmly aligned with the Western alliance at that time. Ankara’s foreign policy stance underwent a noticeable change after both the EU and the US showed disregard for Turkiye’s political and security concerns. Frustrations with the Western powers have evolved into a tangled dilemma, which Erdogan has leveraged for Turkiye’s benefit.
For Ankara, the dual aspects of its foreign policy — the NATO alliance/EU membership and involvement with organizations that oppose the West — are not conflicting but complementary. They are integral components of the country’s foreign policy, which seeks strategic autonomy and flexibility, while aiming to revive Turkiye’s historical significance as a global power bridging East and West.
For instance, Erdogan’s September 2022 statement on the possibility that Turkiye might join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a defense bloc led by China, can be read within this broader context. A few days after this statement, Erdogan delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly arguing that Turkiye is a core part of NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore, Turkiye under Erdogan’s leadership tries to balance between two blocs by leveraging its status. Fidan’s statement on his China visit also echoed Erdogan’s strategy. “While we have a customs union with the EU, we also explore new opportunities for cooperation with several partners in different platforms, such as BRICS,” he said.
This statement about being part of BRICS is significant and it goes beyond a mere desire. Turkiye joining BRICS would provide new opportunities for trade and investment. It would also be part of the multipolar interdependency that means states today want to diversify their diplomatic and economic partnerships. Besides the economic reasons, which are the key motivator for membership, being part of BRICS would also assert Turkiye’s status on the international stage and enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis the Western powers.
There is already energy cooperation between Turkiye, Russia and China over major projects like the TurkStream pipeline and the Belt and Road Initiative. A week before Fidan’s visit, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar was in China for talks involving a third nuclear power plant that Turkiye has been planning to build in the country’s northwest region. Bayraktar subsequently said that the two countries were close to a deal on the plant. Turkiye also seeks closer cooperation with Moscow and Beijing over regional issues, such as the Syrian conflict and tensions in the South Caucasus.
Needless to say, the shrinking of the US’ position in the region has created an opportunity for Russia and China to strengthen their relations with Middle Eastern countries in several aspects, even if it cannot totally fill the American void. Beijing and Moscow provide both Turkiye and other regional states with an opportunity to lessen their dependence on the US as the only heavyweight in the region, while also developing a multifaceted relationship with them. They use platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization effectively, bringing regional states closer to them and further from the US.
