Nikola Mikovic
Russia’s recent decision to suspend its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a UN-backed agreement that has allowed Ukraine to export food during the ongoing conflict, will have repercussions that go beyond threatening global food security. It could also rewrite the region’s political map.
In the eyes of many Russian propagandists, the grain-deal reversal is payback for humiliation caused by Turkiye on July 7, when Ankara repatriated five captured Ukrainian commanders.
The fighters had spent several months in a secure facility in Turkiye after surrendering to Russian troops in the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol last year. They were part of the Azov Regiment, which Russia considers a terrorist organization.
From Moscow’s perspective, Ankara’s decision to send the men home was a slap in the face. If Russia had extended its participation in the grain deal, which uses Turkiye as a transit hub, Moscow would have looked even weaker, the thinking goes.
The withdrawal from the deal does not mean that the Kremlin is ready to reimpose another full-scale blockade of the Black Sea, as it did at the beginning of the war, or that it plans to jeopardize its relations with Ankara. However, there is no doubt that one of the major goals of Russia’s recent missile strikes on Ukrainian ports was to prevent, at least temporarily, the country from exporting grain.
Despite having differing views on the UN-supported export initiative, Moscow and Ankara remain “friends.” The Russian president is expected to visit Turkiye in August, and the grain initiative will be high on the agenda. Although Russia has shown its hand, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insists that Russia is still interested in a continuation of the agreement.
What any new deal might look like remains unclear. Russian officials say that Turkiye will have to purchase Russian grain “at normal world prices.” Ankara, on the other hand, hopes to continue buying both Russian and Ukrainian grain at a discount.
And yet, because Erdogan seems to have the upper hand, it is conceivable that Russia will have to accept Ankara’s conditions. Failure to do so could be costly for Moscow.
For one thing, Turkiye could effectively close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian naval and civilian ships heading to Syria, complicating Moscow’s engagement in the Middle Eastern country.
Russian energy companies involved in multibillion-dollar projects in Turkiye could also be squeezed. Rosatom, which is building a nuclear power plant in the southern Turkish province of Mersin, and Gazprom, which seeks to turn Turkiye into a gas hub, would almost certainly apply pressure on the Kremlin to avoid angering its Turkish counterpart.
Barring that, Turkish authorities could follow the West and impose sanctions on Russian oligarchs who have found safe haven in their country.
Turkiye and Ukraine might even implement a grain deal without the participation of Russia, which would represent another humiliation for Moscow. In this scenario, Ukraine could simply continue exporting grain to Turkiye, ignoring Russia’s threats. Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently called on Erdogan and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to support grain shipments without Russian involvement.
Kyiv and Ankara understand that it is unlikely the Kremlin would dare sink Ukrainian or Turkish civilian ships, as such an action could lead to direct involvement by Turkiye in the war in Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine and Turkiye can simply continue doing grain business as usual.
However, if Moscow did decide to escalate the situation and started attacking ships entering or leaving Ukrainian ports, Kyiv would almost certainly respond. As a last resort, Turkiye could even start supplying Ukraine with weapons via the Black Sea route, which would represent another blow to Russia and its war effort.
To avoid any of these outcomes, the Kremlin might have no choice but to follow Ankara’s lead. The Russian propaganda machine could always spin Moscow’s policy as another “goodwill gesture” with the goal of helping poor countries in Africa. Erdogan might even insist that Moscow continue to send free grain to nations such as Mali, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia — places where Turkiye has been trying to increase its influence.
The fact that Baykar, the Turkish combat drone production company, has begun building a plant in Ukraine clearly indicates that Erdogan feels confident and does not see Russia as a threat to its interests. He knows that if Turkiye is at the table, Russia’s room for political (and even military) maneuvering is limited.
For now, Turkiye is in the driver’s seat. Ankara will not hesitate to push Moscow to reach a new grain deal that saves Ankara money and keeps the world fed. Moscow’s latest move might appear strategic but in reality it is a desperate ploy by a leader quickly running out of options.
