Khaled Abou Zahr
What a difference a year makes. In 2022, think tanks and experts in Washington were describing how Russia was turning Armenia into an outpost or, even worse, a subdued country. Fast forward to today and we are hearing Armenia’s leaders stating their disappointment at Moscow’s stance during the latest clashes with Azerbaijan.
Russia is engulfed on the Ukrainian front and is currently unable to support its historic ally. This latest flare-up raises many questions about Russia’s influence in the Caucasus and beyond. How will this impact the entire Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East area? Will it create other spots of instability where local and regional players might see an opportunity to gain greater influence?
It is interesting to notice that this is not the first time that Moscow’s power has receded in these areas. A clear point in history comes to mind here with the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the first years of the post-Soviet era, Moscow’s influence nearly disappeared. There were no resources, central decision-making or strategic vision to maintain it. There were years of chaos and conflict. It took President Vladimir Putin until the end of the Second Chechen War to reassert and project Russia’s power and influence in the Caucasus region. It was at about the same time that the same thing took place in the Middle East.
There is symbolism in the fact that the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan looks like it is putting the final nail in the coffin of Russia’s strong influence. Many analysts had described a receding Russian influence as early as 1988, when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started. This was furthered after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Could we compare this collapse with Moscow now being drowned on the Ukraine front?
The fact is that Russia does not have — and probably has not had for the past couple of decades — the strongest military in the area. It is the Turkish army and its fellow NATO members that have become the most powerful force. This was very clear in the previous clashes, in which Turkiye gave its support to Azerbaijan, while Russia and Iran backed Armenia. The Azerbaijanis were able to show their military prowess and reconquer their lands.
I would like to digress a little and note the lack of knowledge of many politicians and even journalists in the West who support both Ukraine and Armenia. I recently had a conversation with a French journalist who was vehemently opposed to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and who was, with the same vehemence, standing with Armenia. I simply asked, “Do you think Western countries should stand against all of Russia’s allies?” His answer came swiftly: “Yes, of course.” His silence was just as vehement when I informed him that Russia was Armenia’s closest ally. This creates much more complicated dynamics in this region than most would have the will or patience to analyze.
This balance has been the reality for decades, if not centuries. The main actors are still the same. At the forefront are Turkiye and Iran, while in the background are China, Europe and the US. The dynamic between Russia and its allies such as Iran is complex. Even during the years of positive collaboration, there have been spheres of competition between Moscow and Tehran. This became clear in the Middle East in the Syrian arena — they were both partners and competitors at the same time.
The dominance of Azerbaijan has forced stability for now. But which other areas could go through the same uptick in military violence? The first country that comes to mind is Georgia. This would mean a new conflict similar to the one that took place in 2008, known as the Russo-Georgian War, with the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was described, at the time, as the first European conflict of the 21st century. Is this the time to settle the score?
It seems like Georgia is trying to take advantage of Moscow’s current weakness to further its interests, but without pushing for confrontation. This “nearly rapprochement” could be a way to avoid military conflict while allowing for a new working formula for the disputed regions. This might also mean Tbilisi seeking greater alignment with another power to maintain this new equilibrium. However, the risks of a conflict flaring remain.
There are other regions of course. Some analysts and think tanks go as far as mentioning the possibility of Russia’s southern republics potentially seeking independence from Moscow. This would be in case Russia and its military became too severely weakened by the conflict in Ukraine and it would be a continuation of the post-Soviet era of independence in Russia’s backyard and sphere of influence. But the risks of instability also reach well into the heart of Europe and the Balkans, where Moscow maintains strong historical friendships. There is no doubt that, despite its strong industrial military capacity, Russia would have difficulty maintaining its influence on multiple fronts.
It is interesting to notice nevertheless that Moscow has been capable of asymmetric positioning in the Middle East and Africa, despite the current situation in Ukraine. Indeed, Russia has increased its attacks on rebel bases in Syria. The latest strike took place on Wednesday on a displacement camp in Syria’s northwest, the country’s last main rebel bastion. Here too, we find the same actors, namely Iran and Turkiye, as well as China and the West in the background. There is no doubt that geography, logistics and energy routes entangle the same actors across both regions and into Europe. In Africa, Moscow has been able to reduce Paris’ influence in a way very few expected.
Russia is at risk of losing its influence and other actors might see a window of opportunity. But this risk also means new military conflict areas and the potential for a broader conflict. One thing is for sure: to think that this will mean the complete end of Russia’s influence is naive. Looking back at history, Moscow’s influence is like the seasons of the year — it always comes back.
