Mohammed Abu Dalhoum
The Levant region’s beacon of stability is now facing the maladaptive threat of drug smuggling. The Jordanian security forces have become quite busy with the challenge of combating drug cartels, with reports of foiled drug trafficking attempts now more prevalent than ever before.
In December, Jordan’s security forces arrested or neutralized several smugglers and seized millions of pills, including Captagon and methamphetamine, in heavy clashes with armed individuals on the Jordanian-Syrian border. A report by Alhurra highlighted that Syria has always been the main source of Captagon used in the region, especially in the Gulf, but the civil war in the country offered Syrian cartels more space to enhance their operations, enabling them to manufacture and export much more than they were able to previously.
A byproduct of the increased production and export has been an exponential increase in drug-related offenses in Jordan, including smuggling and trade. In fact, between 2011 and 2022, such offenses increased fivefold, according to data released by the Public Security Directorate. Between January and February of 2022 alone, Jordanian security forces seized more Captagon pills than over the entire course of 2021. The magnitude of this problem is felt deeply among Jordanians. In a survey conducted by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions last November, 61 percent of Jordanians indicated that drug use, trade and smuggling was Jordan’s most significant social issue, marking a 12-percentage point increase from the prior survey conducted in March 2023.
The same survey also found that more than 75 percent of Jordanians believe that illegal drug trafficking is a major issue for Jordan’s borders and 56 percent believe Syria is the main source. While more than half of Jordanians believe the country’s security forces are doing enough to prevent drugs from entering Jordan, the challenge not only remains but has also become more threatening. What sets the recent trafficking incidents apart from previous operations are the volume and type of weapons seized alongside the drugs. In mid-December, Jordanian security forces engaged for several hours with armed groups along the northern border, seizing large amounts of automatic weapons, missiles and ammunition, in what is now clearly a systematic attack on the country’s national security.
The malice of Syrian Captagon cartels is not to be taken lightly. Their attempts to smuggle heavy arms into Jordan – especially considering the current events in the region – necessitate an immediate change to the strategy utilized to counter armed cartels. Granted, Amman had advocated for the return of Syria and Bashar Assad to the Arab League, with the combating of drug trafficking at the helm of its rationale. Syria did agree to curb trafficking across its borders during a meeting held in early May, which convened the foreign ministers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Egypt.
However, Syria’s ties with Iran and the latter’s control over the armed cartels raise questions over Syria’s seriousness in this context. Thus, with the little political will shown by Syria to combat its cartels internally, Jordan should place little faith and confidence in Syria and Assad to aid in combating this threat, whether on their shared borders or on a regional level. Iraq, on the other hand, demonstrates more political will to combat drug trafficking, especially as more than 50 percent of Iraqi youth living near its northwestern border are struggling with Captagon addiction, according to the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council. However, Iraq faces its own challenges in securing its borders and requires immense support.
Coordination and collaboration with Saudi Arabia, another country facing the challenge of Captagon trafficking, is necessary to combat the threat of the armed drug cartels. Jordan and Saudi Arabia seize millions of Captagon pills on a regular basis, yet drug trafficking attempts continue to increase in size and frequency, which is indicative of the magnitude of the challenge the two countries face. The exchange of experiences and strategic intelligence collaboration are imperative for both countries to adapt to the constantly changing nature of this challenge. Enhanced border security is crucial and is arguably more urgently necessary than ever before.
Since then, the challenge has grown and the context has shifted, especially with the war in Gaza, the operations carried out by the armed cartels and Assad’s lack of political will to secure Syria’s borders against trafficking. These developments ought to be addressed with increased financial, security and technological support to ensure Jordan’s capacity to counter the trafficking of drugs and arms in the long term.
Overall, Jordan must not be left alone in this fight. Amman certainly fears a case of deja vu that is reminiscent of the unfulfilled financial promises to aid it in hosting Syrian refugees. The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis was constantly underfunded, with a 70 percent deficit recorded for 2022’s budget alone. A state that has incurred, for 10 years, more than two-thirds of the direct financial costs of hosting Syrian refugees should not be expected to also incur the costs of the security implications alone, especially when it comes to combating the trafficking of drugs and arms that threaten regional security, not just Jordan’s.
