Michael Macarthur Bosack
The Japanese government began 2024 by concluding a flurry of security deals with international partners, garnering much attention both because of the pace and scope of the agreements. These include a new acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with Germany, a defense technology transfer pact with the United Arab Emirates and a deal with the United States to purchase up to 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles. These are just the most recent in a line of international agreements that Tokyo has negotiated in the past few years, as the government seeks to advance its bilateral and multilateral security relationships.
But what are these agreements, and what do they really mean for Japanese security, in practice? Are we seeing the birth of new alliances, or are these simply transactional arrangements? To answer these questions, it is useful to have a sort of Rosetta Stone that can help make sense of the security deals Japan is pursuing and why it is doing so.
The type of agreement that is most often misunderstood is a formal alliance treaty. These are ratified international instruments that include some guarantee for the use of military force, be it offensive or defensive. These treaties can be mutual – meaning that all parties sign up to the same obligations – or unilateral, for example, if one party agrees to defend the other in exchange for another tradeoff. They may also be bilateral or multilateral: They could be between just two countries (like the United States and South Korea), or many (like NATO). Because alliance treaties are formal international agreements and include the obligation to use military force, they have become increasingly rare.
Japan only has one treaty ally and that is the United States. The core tradeoff in this alliance is that the US will come to Japan’s defense in case of need, while Japan provides facilities for the American military to pursue its commitment to international security and stability. Of course, the two countries have built on that foundation through subsequent agreements, and the allies’ mutual expectations are codified in the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, last updated in April 2015. Although agreements under this umbrella have many different names, whenever governments use the term “security cooperation” in an intergovernmental deal, they are generally referencing foreign military sales. This is where one government sells or trades military equipment, technology or training with another. The recent deal in which Japan agreed to acquire Tomahawk missiles from the US is an example of this.
This differs from security assistance, which is the unilateral delivery of military or defense equipment and technology. In other words, when a government provides security assistance, they are essentially giving a partner the assets or know-how to improve their own defense capabilities. For example, Japan has started providing official security assistance to Southeast Asian partners to bolster their ability to reinforce the rules-based international order within their own areas of operation. Both of these differ from joint cooperative development, which is where governments agree to work together to produce new defense equipment or technology. Notably, Japan recently concluded such a deal with the U.K. and Italy to work on a next-generation fighter aircraft.
One of the agreements between Japan and South Korea that garnered significant media attention was the General Sharing of Military Information Agreement, signed in November 2016. The GSOMIA is a type of information-sharing agreement that allows two or more governments to exchange security-related intelligence or information that would normally be considered classified or proprietary. These agreements ensure that partners understand what information needs to be protected, and they codify the rights, duties and obligations related to the intended information exchange. They rarely, if ever, specify what kind of information must be shared; they simply provide the legal framework for how information would be exchanged should the parties deem it necessary.
These agreements are important for military partners who intend to operate together because they need to be making decisions and responding to situations based on common understandings – which is difficult if one party has information that the other is not able to employ in its decision making. Japan has recently concluded a series of reciprocal access agreements (RAAs) with security partners including Australia and the U.K., and it is looking to do so with the Philippines this year.
These agreements enable more flexible military operations in each others’ territories because they provide the legal framework for the deployment of uniformed personnel. They are akin to visiting forces agreements or status of forces agreements, except the provisions are reciprocal – hence the name. While military forces do not necessarily need RAAs to operate in foreign countries, they make things much easier. Rather than having to negotiate the terms of each visit or deployment through diplomatic arrangements, these agreements ensure there are standing provisions for how foreign forces enter a country, the customs and duties they may have to incur, and how they will be treated under the domestic legal system should incidents occur, among other things. What it means in practice is that, while moving forward with mutual security activities, short-notice deployments are easier and parties are much better prepared to address any incidents that may occur.
An ACSA like the one Japan concluded with Germany last month is a deal that allows for militaries and defense forces to share equipment, supplies and facilities. For example, if a German warship needs fuel from a Japanese supply vessel while out to sea, the ACSA provides the legal and financial framework for that refueling activity. These agreements are technical and operational in nature, which might not seem to have significant strategic implications – that is, until one starts to look at how important they are for interoperability. ACSAs eliminate barriers to unit-level cooperation, which serves as the building block for a real and viable security partnership, rather than something that exists only on paper. The last type of deal that Tokyo has recently concluded is a consultation pact, which it signed with the US and South Korea during the Camp David summit last summer.
Many scholars consider a consultation pact to be a lesser form of alliance agreement, in which the signatories commit to engage with each other in response to security incidents or conflict scenarios. It is essentially a pledge that they will work to remain aligned when militarized threats become acute. In some ways, consultation pacts can serve as steppingstones to more formal alliance arrangements. However, the key aspect is that they do not necessarily require legislative ratification. This means that such pacts can be achieved without the added hurdle of pushing them through a parliamentary body – a major step to entering a formal alliance treaty. Ultimately, Tokyo is using these agreements as building blocks for new and lasting security ties with a myriad partners. This step-by-step approach, while perhaps more incremental than some would want, is effective when it comes to institutionalizing relationships. This is especially important as many governments have to weather changes in administration or political sentiments over the years.
Observers should expect the Japanese government to continue pursuing these types of agreements both regionally and globally as it seeks to improve conditions for its self-defense and elevate the country’s security role in reinforcing the rules-based international order.
The Japan Times
