Paul Stronski
The ongoing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is transforming diplomatic and security dynamics in Central Asia, creating opportunities for Russia and China to enhance their engagement with increasingly anxious governments in the region. The resurgence of the Taliban that began in the spring—and their takeover of large swaths of Afghanistan’s territory, including at least eight regional capitals so far—is unnerving senior officials in Central Asia.
Russia, meanwhile, is eager to take advantage of the U.S. withdrawal by shoring up its influence in Central Asia, enhancing its security footprint and preventing Washington from resuming military operations in any Central Asian state. China, too, is stepping up its diplomacy with Central Asia, increasing its bilateral security assistance with Kyrgyzstan and moving to enhance its influence and presence in Tajikistan, which shares a border with the sensitive Xinjiang region in northwestern China. The prospect of a Taliban victory or a civil war in Afghanistan, and its spillover into Central Asia, appears to be pushing Moscow, Beijing and Central Asian governments toward closer cooperation.
For Central Asian countries, the Taliban’s recent successes have raised fears that Afghanistan could reemerge as a magnet for extremists from the region and a sanctuary from which radical groups could target nearby countries. While the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan degraded Central Asian terrorist groups’ ability to operate there over much of the past two decades, militant extremists from Central Asia continue to find safe haven in the country. The Taliban even recently deployed some ethnic Tajik fighters along Afghanistan’s northern border. Therefore, Central Asian governments are now hedging their bets: In addition to asking Russia, China and the United States for help, they are reaching out to the Taliban, seeking assurances that Taliban fighters will neither target Central Asian states nor their interests in Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s rapid territorial gains in Afghanistan have surprised and unnerved many Central Asian officials. Particularly worrying has been the inability of government forces in the northern part of the country, long considered relatively resistant to the Taliban, to halt the insurgents’ onslaught. Over the weekend, the Taliban captured Sheberghan, the capital of Jowzjan province, where they looted and burned the home of the controversial—and ethnically Uzbek—warlord Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former Afghan vice president and leader of one of the country’s largest militias.
The city of Kunduz, a key hub for trade with Tajikistan, also fell Saturday. Taliban forces now control the bulk of the porous, 835-mile Afghan-Tajik border. This includes the U.S.-built Sher Khan Bandar border crossing, which now enables the Taliban to garner lucrative customs revenues.
Insurgents have similarly seized territory along the borders of other nearby countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The latter’s situation is particularly concerning, given its previous struggles to prevent Afghan militants from crossing the border and attacking Turkmen soldiers in 2014-2016. Despite some efforts to modernize and improve the country’s border security after those incursions, Turkmenistan’s security apparatus has long prioritized internal threats over external threats. The military capabilities of the country’s insular and paranoid regime remain untested. Uzbekistan’s military and security apparatus, on the other hand, appears stronger. Tashkent increasingly sees itself as a regional leader in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, even reaching out beyond Central Asia to Pakistan as a potential partner in these efforts.
Another key concern for Central Asian states is the prospect of having to accept large numbers of migrants that could cross the border into their countries to flee the violence. Although there has not yet been mass movement of populations into Central Asia, some Afghan migrants began crossing into Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region in early July—the first such wave in decades, with local officials expecting more to come. The Tajik government has reportedly repatriated 1,600 of those Afghan citizens. These initial flows are in addition to several thousand Afghan troops that fled the Taliban offensive in early summer, though most of them were either stopped at the border or later deported.
The prospect of a Taliban victory or a civil war in Afghanistan appears to be pushing Moscow, Beijing and Central Asian governments toward closer cooperation.
Large-scale refugee flows would have several destabilizing impacts for Central Asian states, including potential security threats and strains on already poorly functioning social safety nets. Poverty rates and food insecurity are already high in the region, which has contributed to a spike in communal violence and clashes between ethnic groups in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic has further strained local health care systems, reducing regional states’ receptivity to refugees.
Preparing for the worst, all three frontline states have moved to reinforce their respective borders with Afghanistan and are seeking help from whichever foreign power is willing to give it. Yet while the Biden administration has made some overtures to Central Asia, governments in the region generally lack confidence in Washington’s commitment to engaging with them after what they consider an American loss of interest in Central Asia beginning with the Obama administration. Gaining a U.S. military presence in Central Asia—even a very small one, as the Biden administration apparently hopes to do—remains a tough sell, as it could provoke the ire of Beijing and Moscow, or even the Taliban and other extremist groups in the region. Neither China nor Russia wants a significant, long-term U.S. presence in Central Asia. Geographic proximity to the region and economic ties give Moscow and Beijing far greater leverage over Central Asia than the U.S. could ever have.
Moscow sees the region as part of its sphere of influence and is eager to capitalize on the U.S. departure from Afghanistan to present itself as Central Asia’s indispensable partner. Russian officials are engaging the Afghan government in Kabul, the Taliban and Central Asian governments, as well as holding discussions on Afghanistan’s future with counterparts in China, the U.S., Pakistan, India and Iran. Putin has reportedly held out the possibility of hosting a small U.S. military presence at Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to monitor developments in Afghanistan, but the offer appears highly conditional and likely indicates Moscow’s desire to circumscribe Washington’s ability to operate in the region rather than a genuine desire to assist.
Russia has also stepped up its regional security engagement. Russia’s military announced last month that it would reinforce its military base in Tajikistan, and it also recently conducted joint military exercises with Uzbek and Tajik forces. Unlike Tajikistan, Uzbekistan has long been reluctant to formally align with Russian-sponsored economic, political or security blocs, so its participation in these drills indicates the Uzbek leadership’s high degree of concern about the situation in Afghanistan.
As for China, it has moved beyond economic engagement to expand its security footprint in Central Asia and Afghanistan, both to protect its economic stakes in the region and to hedge against instability spreading from Afghanistan or Central Asia into Xinjiang. China’s efforts currently focus on bilateral counterterrorism and anti-narcotics assistance to Tajikistan. It has already enhanced its security presence there with a monitoring post on the Afghan-Tajik border, reportedly manned by Chinese special forces. Beijing is also stepping up its security assistance to Kyrgyzstan. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently completed a three-nation tour of Central Asia, engaging with his Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek counterparts and then receiving Taliban representatives in China a week later.
Russian-Chinese military cooperation in Central Asia likely will intensify as a result of the U.S. withdrawal. The prospect of another civil war in Afghanistan, its spillover into neighboring countries, or outright victory by the Taliban is worrisome for both Beijing and Moscow. They have shared strategic interests, not to mention an ideological preference for authoritarian governance, which is also shared by the leaders of all Central Asian countries. China and Russia are also wary of U.S. democracy promotion, favoring centralized strongman rule as a guarantee of domestic stability and regional security. As the U.S. withdraws, these factors will likely continue to bring Central Asia, China and Russia closer together.
