Yossi Mekelberg
In the current, hotter-than-usual cauldron of Israeli society and politics, the main fuel is the ill-intentioned anti-democratic legislation driven by the government which would transfer more power from the judiciary to the unsafe hands of the executive branch. However, as much as the focus is on the so-called judicial reforms, more than ever before, the crisis has exposed deep political and social rifts within Israel that are being exacerbated by a single issue that channels into it much of these divisions as well as the deep-seated malaise and resentment harbored by different parts of Israeli society.
It is right at this point in time to direct much of the effort, even the anger, toward opposing the coalition government’s blitz of legislation that will not only deal a huge blow to democracy but will also facilitate corruption at the heart of government, compromise any semblance of good governance and impoverish the country, and is also bound to increase tensions with friends and allies within and beyond the Middle East.
Nevertheless, the battle for the democratic character of the state, which is taking place mainly on the streets but also in the Knesset, the media, the military and every other possible avenue, is about the very character of the country and its people.
On the eve of the 75th anniversary of its independence, many of the unresolved issues that have always divided Israelis have surfaced after being swept under the carpet for decades, often for the sake of unity in the face of security threats, some more genuine than others, which have often been cynically exploited by unscrupulous politicians to gain and maintain their power.
To begin with, the Zionist dream of forming a Jewish and democratic society, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, was faced with enormous challenges before the ink of the founding fathers’ signatures had dried. It might have been a nice dream, at least for the Zionist movement, of gathering as many Jews as possible from around the world to build a national home, under some rough idea of what Judaism is, in the hope that this would be enough of a foundation on which to build a coherent society. But despite some considerable initial success, cracks soon appeared in the edifice.
Considering the many different strands of Judaism, let alone the fact that for many Jewish-Israelis theirs is more a form of cultural and national identity rather than a religious one, frictions were inevitable.
Moreover, to live up to the ideals and pronouncements of the Declaration of Independence about the equal status of each and every one of its citizens and respecting their diverse identities, Israelis should have recognized from the outset that their Arab-Palestinian minority was bound to identify more with the democratic than the Jewish character of the state, and that this should not diminish in any shape or form their equality under the law, nor result in their being subjected to informal discrimination. These conditions should have been accompanied by full respect for their national, religious and cultural identity, not to mention sensitivity to the terrifying catastrophe of the Nakba that they were forced to endure.
Instead this large minority, one that comprises 20 percent of the population, has always been treated with suspicion and discriminated against instead of being truly integrated. Hence, it is not shocking that many Palestinian Israelis don’t participate in the current protests and have little expectations of any Israeli government, regardless of its political persuasion.
Furthermore, whenever a major issue of profound disagreement surfaces in Israel, as is the case with the current attacks on the checks and balances in the country’s governing system, the ethnic divide between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews returns to play a role in the discourse, and often in its nastiest form.
At the best of times this unresolved issue — which originated in the early days of the state when Jews who came from the Arab world were looked down on and suffered discrimination by the country’s authorities and institutions that were dominated by Jews from Central and Eastern Europe — has been a major hurdle in building both nation and state.
In times of crisis this social cleavage is always exploited by right-wing and religious politicians, and by nobody more effectively than Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in order to rally support from the Mizrahis by portraying his political rivals as privileged Ashkenazis who patronize Mizrahi Jews and treat them as second class citizens.
To this end, in the current crisis Netanyahu has greatly exaggerated the fact that the makeup of the Supreme Court is not truly representative of Israeli society’s diversity. This is not to argue that discrimination does not take place, or that there is no need for a drive to invest in parts of the society, mainly those from the Middle East, who have been left behind, especially as Israel is now an affluent country though too many of its citizens do not enjoy the fruits of this success. And because Netanyahu’s Likud party has been in power for a long time, and Netanyahu has been prime minister since 2009 except for a very short break, they can hardly blame anyone else for this situation.
There is also no doubt that over the years the schism between the country’s secular liberal-progressive Jews and its religious Jews has deepened. It would be oversimplistic to describe it as a straightforward secular-religious divide, as neither is a monolithic group. Yet, whether it is the religious-nationalists who have driven the settlements project and are perpetuating the conflict with the Palestinians, or the ultra-orthodox who are happy to enjoy power in government with its generous budgets without serving in the military or generating wealth while imposing religious legislation, their actions have had a huge impact on the character of the country and are resented by secular Israelis, who are demographically dwindling in numbers.
It would appear that the current debate over the constitutional crisis, in a country that does not have a constitution, is focusing only on the relations between the different branches of government. The nature of the debate reveals the fragility of both Israeli society and Israeli democracy. However, it is also an opportune moment for redrafting the social contract between the government and its citizens, which should start with a decrease in the divisive rhetorical flames that Netanyahu and his allies thrive on.
Instead, in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, there is a desperate need to search for common ground that is inclusive of all Israel’s citizens, with no exceptions, and to seek to establish both peace at home, but also equally important, peace with the Palestinians.
