Simon Schlegel
Ukrainian forces are in the midst of a counteroffensive aimed at liberating all of the country, including regions under occupation since 2014. If they are successful, they face the challenge not just of physically rebuilding decimated areas and documenting Russian war crimes, but also of how to deal with Ukrainian collaborators – people who are judged to have aided and abetted the occupation.
Kyiv’s approach to collaborators was front of mind at the Ukrainian Recovery conference in London last week, as international supporters met Ukrainian government representatives and civil society. While calling for a hard line on collaborators is popular, that approach could ultimately prove shortsighted and hamper Ukraine’s immediate efforts at integration and rebuilding, as well as its long-term social cohesion.
There is a law on the books already dealing with this issue. In the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Ukrainian parliament hurriedly passed legislation to deter citizens from collaborating with the occupiers. While the law only poorly defines what qualifies as collaboration, the penalties it imposes are steep. In addition to fines, confiscation of property and bans from holding public office, potential punishment extends to life in prison when the perpetrator’s actions led to serious harm or death.
The cases that have been brought under the law demonstrate the wide variation in what may qualify as collaboration: while some of those prosecuted took on lucrative positions in Russia’s occupying administration, others wearily continued their jobs providing basic services in local administration or education. The law therefore often targets the very people most needed for recovery, for example by keeping teachers who worked for Russian-administered schools from resuming their jobs. There is also the issue that the Ukrainian criminal justice system is ill-equipped to handle collaboration cases. Judges and police are already struggling to investigate the more than 90,000 war crimes that prosecutors believe Russian forces have perpetrated. Hard-to-find forensic specialists must investigate war crimes and appraisers must assess the damage to infrastructure in recovered areas in order to calibrate what compensation payments to offer residents.
In addition, these recovered areas are often economically depressed and in some cases strewn with landmines; as a result, people with the necessary skills to conduct investigations into collaboration will be disinclined to relocate. All these obstacles mean a case-by-case treatment of suspects could take decades and demand resources that are not currently available. The international community can play a constructive role in helping Ukraine manage the reintegration of communities that were subject to Russian control. Supporters could, for example, create incentives for the most needed specialists to relocate to liberated areas, even for short stints. They can also help train local people and potential returnees to take over mediation of conflicts around accusations of collaboration, and conduct appraisal of physical damage to speed up compensation payments.
International supporters could also push for the Ukrainian parliament to amend its collaboration law to be more precise and ensure it aligns with international humanitarian law, which mandates that an occupying power must maintain essential services. That means people who provide key services in medical care, administration or education are generally permitted to continue exercising their professional duties even when occupying forces are in control. Convincing Ukrainian leaders to amend the collaboration law may not be a hard sell.
Iryna Vereshchuk, the Ukrainian minister responsible for reintegration, has cautioned against collectively branding everyone who continued working under Russian occupation as collaborators. Ukrainian officials from Crimea who have fled to Kyiv have warned that after the peninsula’s anticipated liberation the collaboration law could lead to blanket prosecutions of Crimeans who have lived under occupation since 2014.
With such concerns in mind, parliament has begun debating several amendments. The liberal Holos party, for instance, filed a draft law that would exempt combatants forcibly mobilised by Russia in occupied parts of Ukraine. With priorities having moved on to other pressing matters, however, these draft laws have been pending for months. Even if they are ultimately passed into law, they probably won’t go far enough. While reforms to the collaboration law are under way, supporters can prod the Ukrainian government to apply it prudently. In particular, they can encourage an emerging trend of applying the full force of the law only to powerful perpetrators whose collaboration can be linked to tangible harm, or who coerced others into collaboration.
Mass indictments of suspected collaborators would sow suspicion between liberators and the liberated, overwhelm the judiciary and sideline a much-needed workforce.
A clearer definition of what constitutes collaboration could help people currently living under occupation make sound judgments about their options and what awaits them after liberation. This would be an important step towards welcoming people still living under occupation as valued participants in the country’s future recovery. Taking a hard line on collaboration could ultimately lead to human rights violations and create conflicts that make it difficult for Ukrainian communities to heal. As supporters contemplate what Ukraine will need during the war and in its aftermath, they should not lose sight of the fact that sensitively dealing with collaboration will be a crucial ingredient to a sustainable peace.
